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I. INTRODUCTION
Three blind men inspect an elephant.  Each touches a different part of 
the elephant and comes to a different conclusion about what the elephant 
“looks like.” Although they are each correct—in part—their conclusions 
seem to represent very different beasts.  This story shows that what is
“true” is a function of what one sees.  But, what about more complex
events and information where it may be challenging for an individual to
see the entire “animal”?  Just as the blind men are missing the big 
picture because they lack complete vision, individuals may be “blind” to 
a bigger picture because of cognitive biases that studies repeatedly show 
all individuals have.1  Although there are many biases, the primary focus 
1. The issue of cognitive biases has recently infiltrated popular discussion.  E.g., 
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005); DANIEL 
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here is on seeing what we want to see consistent with our original
views—a phenomenon called “confirmation bias.”2 
This Article focuses on certain beliefs concerning patents and 
pharmaceutical innovation that are reinforced through confirmation bias.
This focus is an attempt to explain two distinct, yet different, views.  On 
the one hand, scholars who focus on patent theory frequently hail the 
pharmaceutical industry as an example of how patents work as intended.3 
These scholars note that because development costs are high and 
imitation is inexpensive, patents are essential and effective in promoting 
innovation that would otherwise be unlikely to occur.4  Accordingly, they
either resist changes to the current system,5 or they argue for increased 
patent and related protection.6  On the other hand, scholars who focus on 
2. See infra Part II.B.2. 
3. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 282 (2011)
(“If there is one industry where the conventional ‘incentive theory’ of patents is actually
true, it is the pharmaceutical industry.”).
4. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 42–43 (2004) (explaining that unlike a business that builds a
new factory, a pharmaceutical business is building an intangible asset that is easier to
steal); see also Laura Magazzini et al., Patent Disclosure and R&D Competition in
Pharmaceuticals, 18 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 467, 467 (2009) (“The
pharmaceutical industry is a textbook example . . . for which patent protection assures 
appropriability, thus providing incentives for innovation.”). 
5. For example, in the recent discussion of the need for major patent reform, 
pharmaceuticals were considered one of the few areas not in need of change.  See, e.g., 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 41 (Stephen A.
Merrill et al. eds., 2004). 
6. Although patents are technically only one aspect of legal protection for drugs,
they are the most well-known and thus the focus of this Article.  However, there are 
related protections such as data exclusivity and patent linkage, explained in more detail 
in Part IV. Scholars familiar with the protection of drugs often advocate increasing all of
these protections. See, e.g., Shamnad Basheer, The Invention of an Investment Incentive 
for Pharmaceutical Innovation, 15 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 305, 305 (2012); Dan L. 
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1615–17 
(2003); Dana P. Goldman et al., The Benefits from Giving Makers of Conventional 
“Small Molecule” Drugs Longer Exclusivity over Clinical Trial Data, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
84, 89 (2011); Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2157, 
2164 (2011); Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645, 645 (2011); Benjamin N. Roin, 
Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 557 (2009); see 
also John M. Golden, Innovation Dynamics, Patents, and Dynamic-Elasticity Tests for 
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how patents impact access to low-cost medicine tend to criticize patents 
as both failing to incentivize drugs for unprofitable treatments as well as 
overincentivizing development of minimally innovative drugs.7 These
scholars generally do not aim to modify the patent system but instead
suggest solutions beyond the patent system to promote the desired
innovation.8 
This seeming disconnect in discussions prompted this Author to look
for a reason why this might be the case.9  Cognitive biases provide an 
explanation for why there are different views as well as why each side
may be blind to considering that there is another side.  In addition, such 
biases may provide a more productive explanation for the beliefs and
actions of self-interested companies, rather than the usual assumption
that they are greedy companies that place profits ahead of patients.  This
Article is not interested in adding to the thus far unproductive phenomenon 
of blaming profit-based companies for not operating more like humanitarian
organizations.10 
the Promotion of Progress, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 50 (2010) (suggesting stronger patent
rights to speed technological progress, albeit recognizing this would impose costs on follow-
on innovators). But see Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. 
L. REV. 379, 446–47 (2012) (suggesting that although some have argued for broader patent
rights for pharmaceutical and biomedical inventions, these inventions already have broad 
rights).
7. See, e.g., COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 5, 8, 11–12 (2006); Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An
Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031,
1038–39 (2005); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives To Promote 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855, 1855 (2010); Aidan Hollis, An
Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation (June 10, 2004) (unpublished paper)
(on file with the World Health Organization), available at http://www.who.int/intellectual 
property/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf.
8. See, e.g., STAN FINKELSTEIN & PETER TEMIN, REASONABLE RX: SOLVING THE 
DRUG PRICE CRISIS xvi (2008) (suggesting a major structural reform of the drug
industry); Brita Pekarsky, Should Financial Incentives Be Used To Differentially Reward 
“Me-Too” and Innovative Drugs?, 28 PHARMACOECONOMICS 1, 7–8 (2010) (discussing
reference pricing, modifications in regulatory approval, and prizes); James Love & Tim 
Hubbard, Comment, The Big Idea: Prizes To Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1520 (2007) (suggesting offering prizes in lieu of patents). 
9. At one point, this Author considered framing the issue as myths.  However, 
after further investigation, grounding the discussion in cognitive biases seemed more
intellectually robust.  A myth suggests that there is no basis, whereas the beliefs here are
not completely unsubstantiated.  In addition, cognitive bias theory explains why these beliefs 
have propagated—a phenomenon that is not explained by labeling something a myth. 
10. See, e.g., Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs:
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Each of the views concerning patents and pharmaceutical innovation
could be considered one side of the elephant because each is true, yet 
incomplete.  For example, although it is true that there are many studies 
showing that patents are important to investments in pharmaceutical
research, the data is more ambiguous on whether more patent protection
produces more innovation. In fact, those that argue for stronger patents 
often do not cite such data and instead only reference studies that
compare patent protection versus no patents at all.11  Moreover, there is 
the question of what type of innovation patents produce. Whereas many
scholars do not evaluate what type of innovation patents seem to
produce in the area of pharmaceuticals, there is data that most innovation
is in fact incremental and of limited medical significance.  This has been
noted by some scholars and policymakers but minimized by others.12 
Some scholars and policymakers may consider this of no moment
because they argue that innovation in all areas is incremental.13  However, 
pharmaceutical innovation is different. This is an area with implications 
for public health, as recognized by some outside the field of patents, 
such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, which have recommended 
steps to move away from producing more drugs of minimal therapeutic 
value.14  In addition, unlike most other areas, there is actual data that most 
pharmaceutical innovation is incremental.15 
This Article builds upon a growing literature concerning cognitive 
biases, as well as world views, referred to here as “schemas,”16 and their 
(2003); Rhona MacDonald & Gavin Yamey, Op-Ed., The Cost to Global Health of Drug
Company Profits, 174 W. J. MED. 302, 302 (2001); Emmanuel Kolawole Oke, Using the
Right to Health To Enforce the Corporate Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies 
with Regard to Access to Medicines, 1 J. HEALTH DIPL. 1, 1 (2013). 
11. See infra Part III.C.2. 
12. See infra Part III.B. 
13. See infra Part III.C.3. 
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2012) (providing expedited approval for certain 
“breakthrough” treatments); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON PROPELLING INNOVATION IN DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
EVALUATION (2012) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT].
15. See infra Part III.B. 
16. This Article uses the term schema broadly to refer to any organizing principle,
hypothesis, script, or prototype that functions as a mental organizing system.  See, e.g., 
MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS ET AL., SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED INTRODUCTION 68
423 
 
    
 












   
 





   
      
     
  
 
    






implications for law and policy.  Although there is a robust body of 
scholarship concerning cognitive biases in the form of stereotypes such
as race or gender,17 scholarship concerning cognitive biases relating to 
intellectual property is more limited. In addition, intellectual property
articles have thus far focused on aspects of judicial decisionmaking, such
as hindsight bias.18  This Article, in contrast, focuses on schemas and
cognitive biases that exist long before there is any legal case to adjudicate.
Although there are some scholars who have identified schemas with legal
implications, no scholars have previously identified schemas in the area
of patents and pharmaceutical innovation.19 
This Article suggests that brand name pharmaceutical companies, such
as Pfizer and Eli Lilly, act consistently with research showing that
individuals and entities have self-interest biases, which shape their world
view and, in turn, results in them processing information consistent with
that view. These individual companies, as well as Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the lobbying group that 
represents the companies,20 act consistently with cognitive bias studies. 
(2d ed. 2006); Reid Hastie, Schematic Principles in Human Memory, in 1 SOCIAL 
COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 39, 39–47 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981). 
17. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 
(2005); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, 
and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007). 
18. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration
that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 
(2006); Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303 (2012). 
19. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, 
Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649 
(2006); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004) [hereinafter
Categorically Biased]; Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The
Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(2004) [hereinafter The Illusion of Law]; Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral 
Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors 
(and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1998).  In addition, some scholars
have started to focus on confirmation bias in certain realms beyond the judicial arena. 
See, e.g., Matthew S. Hirshberg, The Self-Perpetuating National Self-Image: Cognitive 
Biases in Perceptions of International Interventions, 14 POL. PSYCHOL. 77 (1993); Brett 
McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629 (2011); 
Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward 
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139 (2006). 
20. See ABOUT PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/about (last visited May 20, 2014).
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In particular, studies repeatedly show that individuals presented with 
information contrary to their beliefs may actually become more entrenched
in their beliefs.21 
Although the actions and statements of companies and lobbying
organizations could be more cynically viewed as misrepresentation,
cognitive bias provides an alternative and more productive explanation. 
If companies are simply misrepresenting, the natural reaction is to simply
accuse them of bad will.  Studies, however, suggest that this may cause
further polarization and thus would be the worst possible approach.22 
Also, even if there is some intentional misrepresentation, it could stem from
differing underlying world views (schemas), such that consideration of 
cognitive bias makes sense.
In addition, regardless of the explanation for the public statements of
companies and PhRMA, these statements result in important, yet thus far
unacknowledged, cognitive biases of scholars and policymakers.  In
particular, scholars’ and policymakers’ repetition of industry views have 
combined to contribute to a largely uncritical view of the impact of 
pharmaceutical companies because PhRMA represents these companies.  Of course, it
should be noted that for the general thesis of this Article, the industry is treated as acting 
similarly, when in fact, companies occasionally take different action.  In particular, Andrew 
Witty, the Chief Executive Officer of GlaxoSmithKline has challenged one of the schemas 
noted here, stating that the oft-cited cost of each new drug is “one of the great myths of the
industry” and that drugs can in fact be priced lower.  Ben Hirschler, GlaxoSmithKline Boss Says 
New Drugs Can Be Cheaper, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/03/14/us-glaxosmithkline-prices-idUSBRE92D0RM20130314. The uniqueness of
this statement is underscored by the fact that it was challenged on a blog post. Derek 
Lowe, GlaxoSmithKline’s CEO on the Price of New Drugs, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 21, 2013, 
10:32 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/1292031-glaxosmithklines-ceo-on-the-price-of-
new-drugs.
21. See infra Part II.B.2. 
22. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When Disagreement Gets Ugly: 
Perceptions of Bias and the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
833 (2008). Although difficult to implement in practice, studies suggest that if the message
can be delivered by a perceived “in-group” member, it is much more likely to be tolerated
rather than rejected.  See, e.g., Matthew J. Hornsey & Sarah Esposo, Resistance to Group
Criticism and Recommendations for Change: Lessons from the Intergroup Sensitivity Effect, 
3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 275 (2009); Matthew J. Hornsey & Armin Imani, 
Criticizing Groups from the Inside and the Outside: An Identity Perspective on the Intergroup
Sensitivity Effect, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 365 (2004); Dean Morier et 
al., The Effects of Group Identity, Group Choice, and Strength of Group Identification on















       
 
 








patent law and policy on pharmaceutical innovation.  At the same time, 
cognitive biases explain why arguments criticizing the effectiveness of 
the patent system in promoting more socially beneficial pharmaceutical
innovation are easily ignored.  Studies repeatedly show that all individuals 
tend to reject information and views that are inconsistent with their 
preexisting views.23  In addition, people are prone to believe repeated
facts.24  Consequently, the pharmaceutical companies’ oft-repeated views of
pharmaceutical innovation and patent policy are likely generally accepted,
rather than critically evaluated.  In other words, this Article explains and 
illustrates a cascade of cognitive biases impacting pharmaceutical innovation 
and patent policy.
This Article suggests that pharmaceutical companies and some scholars
have certain schemas that have been reinforced by confirmation bias and
propagated to others, such as policymakers, through repetition.25  First, there 
is the “high cost” schema that suggests that every drug costs $1 billion to
develop when the reality is that most new drugs cost a fraction of that 
price.26  Admittedly, even a fraction of $1 billion is still quite expensive, 
but the exaggerated number has important implications for how 
policymakers and scholars consider ways that patent law should be 
tailored to promote innovation.  Second, there is an “innovation” schema 
that assumes that companies are highly innovative when in reality, most 
of the “new” drugs they produce are modest improvements that often
have little therapeutic value.27  Although small innovation is better than 
none at all, the assumption that most new drugs are highly innovative 
also implicates patent law and policy. The last schema builds on the first
two schemas.  In particular, the “strong patent” schema suggests that patent 
protection should be strong and that there are no net negative social 
repercussions to such protection.28  It is undisputed that patents are valuable
and even essential to pharmaceutical companies, unlike other areas 
of technology, such as software, where other issues, such as first-mover
23. See infra Part II.B.2. 
24. See infra Part II.C.1. 
25. These proposed schemas may admittedly be a result of this Author’s own 
cognitive biases.  Nonetheless, this Article aims to provide ample evidence that these 
proposed schemas are widely held by many and accepted as truth, rather than simply a
viewpoint.
26. See infra Part III.A. 
27. See infra Part III.B. 
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advantage, are more important.29  However, the value of patents to
companies does not necessarily justify the schema that stronger patents will
yield more net social benefits.  After all, as all scholars recognize, patents
always have a “deadweight loss” to the extent that some consumers will
not be able to afford the patented drug that is sold at a patent premium.30 
This is a definite negative repercussion that is generally given short shrift in
discussions that advocate stronger patent rights for pharmaceuticals.  In
addition, this schema assumes that patents promote innovation without
considering whether the social cost of a patent is equally justified for 
less innovative drugs. 
None of these schemas are intended to suggest ill will on the part of 
either companies or scholars.  However, recognizing that they are in fact 
schemas, rather than undisputed facts, is a first step towards recognizing
their impact.  This Article aims to show that existing cognitive biases 
perpetuate current laws that mostly promote modest innovation, with
unjustified social costs.
This Article is timely in revealing the existence and impact of cognitive 
biases in pharmaceutical innovation.  In particular, the pharmaceutical
industry is currently experiencing a crisis in the development of innovative,
new drugs.31  Although there have been exponential increases in the
29. See, e.g., C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 231 (1973); Richard C. Levin et 
al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, in 3 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783, 784, 794–95 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston
eds., 1987); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI., 
173, 174 (1986); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000). 
30. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement 
as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1602 (2006); Clarisa Long, 
Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 633 n.26 (2002); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868 n.124
(1990).
31. See, e,g., PCAST REPORT, supra note 14, at vii; Fabio Pammolli et al., The 
Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 428,
429 (2011); Liza Vertinsky, Making Knowledge and Making Drugs? Experimenting with 
University Innovation Capacity, 62 EMORY L.J. 741, 747–48 (2013); Richard A. Friedman, A 
Dry Pipeline for Psychiatric Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013, at D3, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/health/a-dry-pipeline-for-psychiatric-drugs.html?_r=0. Although 






















    
 
   




   
 
 
   
  
    
amount of money spent on research and development, there has been no 
corollary increase in new drugs; rather, innovation has generally been 
stagnant for years.32 
Brand name pharmaceutical companies may rationally seek more legal
protection for drugs, not only to arguably promote more innovation but
also to buffer against other financial pressures.  In particular, such
companies argue that the pending expiration of patents on “blockbuster” 
drugs, each of which generates over $1 billion in sales, together with 
competition from lower cost generic drugs, erodes their profits, as well
as the ability to fund future innovation.33  For example, when patent 
protection for the popular cholesterol-fighting drug Lipitor expired in 
2011, Pfizer’s sales of Lipitor dropped by seventy-one percent, and
Pharmaceutical Research and Development: What Do We Get for All That Money?, 
BRIT. MED. J., Aug. 7, 2012, at 1 (claiming innovation crisis is a myth used as a ploy to
get government benefit, but nonetheless arguing that there is a crisis with respect to an
inadequate number of new drugs that represent a true therapeutic advance); Bernard
Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 8 NATURE REV. DRUG
DISCOVERY 959, 959–60 (2009) (concluding no decline in productivity, using an unduly
restrictive data set).
32. See, e.g., PCAST REPORT, supra note 14, at 9–10; Jeff Hewitt et al., Beyond
the Shadow of a Drought: The Need for a New Mindset in Pharma R&D, OLIVER WYMAN 1,
3–4 (2011), http://www.oliverwyman.com/media/OW_EN_HLS_PUBL_2011_Beyond
_the_Shadow_of_a_Drought%283%29.pdf; Measuring the Return from Innovation: Is
R&D Earning its Investment?, DELOITTE 1, 9 (2011), https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
Poland/Local%20Assets/Documents/Raporty,%20badania,%20rankingi/pl_raport_chemiczny
_2011.pdf.  Although some thought that innovation might be increasing given a fifteen-
year record number of thrity-nine new drugs approved in 2012 versus thirty in 2011, 
there were only twenty-seven new drugs in 2013. See Novel New Drugs: 2013 Summary, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 2–3 (Jan. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DrugInnovation/UCM381803.pdf.  Although some note
that the lower numbers are not a cause of concern due to decreased applications, even 
that can be problematic given that fewer drugs will be unlikely to sustain the drug companies.
See, e.g., Bernard Munos, The FDA Approvals of 2013: A Watershed?, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2014, 
4:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmunos/2014/01/03/the-fda-approvals-of-
2013-a-watershed (noting that the average output from large pharmaceutical companies in
the last five years is not enough to support current sales).  Although the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) notes that the 2013 approval rate is on par with long term averages
since 2003, this could still be problematic because the productivity does not match the
increased money spent on research.  See, e.g., Michael Lanthier et al., An Improved Approach 
to Measuring Drug Innovation Finds Steady Rates of First-In-Class Pharmaceuticals,
1987-2011, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1433, 1433 (2013) (noting the “sluggish” pace of new molecular
entity (NME) approvals since 2000 and concern about the industry output given greatly
increased research and development). 
33. See, e.g., Grabowski et al., supra note 6, at 2157.  In addition, some claim that 
the costs of developing drugs are also increasing due to more extensive and expensive 
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Pfizer’s overall revenues dropped by seven percent.34 A number of legal
and economic scholars are sympathetic to this position because patents 
are generally considered the primary policy tool to promote innovation.35 
However, the assumption that stronger patent rights will promote
innovation may rest in part on the cognitive biases that perpetuate it.
Despite the prevailing view that the pharmaceutical industry is a clear 
success story for the effectiveness of patents, more protection may not be
the best answer.  For example, although there are many new drugs to treat
erectile dysfunction and obesity, there are not enough drugs that effectively 
treat conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease.36  In addition, even in areas
where there are a number of drugs, such as treatment for cancer or acid 
reflux, the drugs may be very similar in terms of how they operate and
their side effect profiles.37  Granted, having more drug options may be
valuable if they have different side effect profiles.  Nonetheless, current
patent law and policy, in conjunction with existing cognitive biases, 
contribute to duplication in some areas and inadequate development in 
others. This inefficiency poses particular problems in the pharmaceutical
industry because an increase in the number of similar patented drugs 
does not necessarily reduce the cost of individual drugs beyond a negligible 
amount.  The cost of patented drugs can be severe for individuals without 
34. E.g., Alan Rappeport, Pfizer Feels Impact of End to Lipitor Patent, FIN. TIMES, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9820326a-9398-11e1-8ca8-00144feab49a.html#axzz2tXPLw8LT 
(last updated May 1, 2012, 11:01 PM).  The issue is not just that companies lose sales, 
but they lose them quickly.  See, e.g., Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening to Generic Prozac:
Winners, Losers, and Sideliners, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2004, at 210, 213 (noting that 
whereas generics previously took a year to surpass the original product in market share, 
this happened less than six months after Prozac’s patent expired). 
35. See, e.g., supra note 6; see also infra Part IV.B. (suggesting a contrary approach). 
36. See Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval 
Process, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 618–19 (2006). 
37. See, e.g., Laura Beil, The Cancer “Breakthroughs” That Cost Too Much and
Do Too Little, NEWSWEEK, http://www.newsweek.com/cancer-breakthroughs-cost-too-
much-and-do-too-little-64531 (last updated Sept. 27, 2012, 10:02 PM); Using the Proton
Pump Inhibitors To Treat Heartburn and Stomach Acid Reflux: Comparing Effectiveness,
Safety, and Price, CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/health/resources 
/pdf/best-buy-drugs/PPIsUpdate-FINAL.pdf (last updated July 2013) (suggesting that most



















adequate financial resources and can result in avoidance of necessary
medical care.38 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides background to 
understand the three schemas discussed in Parts III and IV. Part II 
begins with some fundamental concepts of how drugs are developed as 
well as the relevance of patent protection and the market place to that 
development.  Most of Part II, however, focuses on the rich cognitive 
bias literature that is necessary to lay the foundation for why patent 
policy should be reevaluated.  In particular, this Part explains schemas 
and the studies that show how they are reinforced through confirmation
bias and repetition. 
Part III applies the cognitive bias research to establish three schemas 
of pharmaceutical innovation and patent protection, and how they have 
persisted through confirmation bias and repetition.  This Part provides 
evidence of the three schemas outlined above: (i) that the average cost of 
every drug is $1 billion (cost schema), (ii) that the industry is highly 
innovative (innovation schema), and (iii) that pharmaceuticals should 
have stronger patent protection because there are no net negative social
repercussions (strong patent schema).  Although each one of these schemas 
has some basis in reality, they are not indisputable truths, as will be
explained.
Part IV then considers the implications of the revealed schemas.  This
Part provides concrete suggestions for not only avoiding unintentionally
reinforcing the schemas but also more directly challenging them.  This 
Part also advocates for a change in patent policy in light of the fact that 
previously presumed tenets of patent law and policy are in fact only 
partially supported schemas.  In particular, this Article argues that scholars 
and policymakers should be more hesitant to provide patent and related
protection for drugs; this proposition is strikingly different and is contrary to
conventional wisdom.  Lastly, this Part considers areas in need of further 
research as possible additional schemas, followed by a brief conclusion. 
38. E.g., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr.
2009), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7891.pdf (finding that 
about one-third of patients do not comply with prescriptions because of the cost); see 
also Kevin Sack, Slump Pushing Cost of Drugs Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, 
at A1 (noting an increasing number of patients struggling to comply with drug treatments due
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II. BACKGROUND 
This Part provides fundamental background to both the development 
of drugs as well as the operation of cognitive biases that are essential to 
understanding the schemas discussed in Parts III and IV. 
A. Pharmaceutical Development and Commercialization 
This subpart briefly outlines how drugs are developed and commercialized,
as well as the role of patent protection.  This subpart first explains that 
there are different types of drugs that may all seem “new” to a consumer
but are actually different from a scientific, regulatory, and innovative 
perspective. Then, this subpart explains the theoretical and practical role
of patents in the development of new drugs. 
1. Types of Drugs 
For consumers, there are essentially two categories of prescription drugs: 
brand name drugs and generic versions of those drugs.  As most consumers 
know, the brand name drugs are priced at a premium while under patent
protection. This is because a patent entitles its owner to exclude all others
from making or selling the patented drug during its term of protection.39 
After a term of less than twenty years,40 companies can make generic 
versions, and when there are multiple generic versions, the price drops 
substantially.41 
39. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
40. The patent term is a bit complicated because it is calculated not from the date the 
patent issues but from the date an application for a patent was filed.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) 
(2012). Moreover, the date of patent issuance is often before FDA approval, such that 
the effective period when a patented drug can be sold is usually shorter than the patent term. 
See Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm (last updated Dec. 5, 2012). 
41. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1995 (2007) (providing data that the price of a drug drops to
ninety-four percent of its original price when a single generic is introduced, to fifty-two 
percent of its original price with two generic manufacturers, and to a mere third or less of its 
original price when there are five or more generics).  This is particularly true for blockbuster 
drugs that tend to have more generic entrants.  See, e.g., Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret 




















     
 
    
   
 
  
   
   
 
A brand name drug must be developed and extensively tested to show
that it is safe and effective, such that it will be approved for sale by the 
FDA.42  This can take a number of years because it can take time to not 
only first find a promising chemical compound but also test that compound 
in multiple stages of animal and human clinical trials to ensure that it not 
only is effective but also is safe.43 
In contrast, a generic drug has an abbreviated path to market.  Indeed, 
the FDA refers to applications to sell generic drugs as abbreviated 
applications because much less is required.44  First, there is no discovery
process because generics generally copy successful brand name drugs
that have already been approved.45  In addition, although a generic still
needs FDA approval, it only needs minimal testing to be approved.  The
generic only needs to have testing that shows that it is “bioequivalent” to
the previously approved brand drug, such that the FDA can infer that the
earlier clinical tests for safety and efficacy of the brand name drug also
apply to the generic.46 
In addition, although consumers tend to view a drug as either a brand 
name or generic, there are in fact two very different scientific categories 
of brand name drugs.  A brand drug can be either a new molecule that 
was never previously approved for sale or an incremental modification 
to something that previously existed; the technical terms are new molecular 
entity (NME) and incremental modification (IMD).47 The new molecules
take longer to develop but are more likely to result in treatments that are 
dramatically different.  An incremental modification, although potentially of
some clinical benefit, is likely to mostly be an improvement of an existing
treatment.48  For example, a different dosage, or different administration— 
oral, rather than injection—would be an incremental modification.49 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 494 (2007) (stating that drugs with over $500 
million in sales are likely to have more than seven competitors after year one).
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(b) (2012). 
43. See  FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE 
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 6–7 (2003). 
44.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (2012). 
45. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 43, ch. 3, at 9 n.38. 
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(iv) (2012). 
47. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 43, ch. 3, at 4; WARREN KAPLAN ET AL., 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PRIORITY MEDICINES FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD 2013 UPDATE
25–26 (2013).
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The FDA classifies drugs based on perceived clinical benefit at the
time of application. The FDA has a classification system to give faster
“priority” review to drug applications most likely to provide clinical 
benefit; all others are given “standard” review.50  The FDA classifies 
drugs for priority review if they are perceived to have just one of a number 
of benefits, such as increased effectiveness, reduced side effects, enhanced 
patient compliance, or usefulness in a new subpopulation of patients.51 
Importantly, as will be discussed later, a substantial  number of new drugs 
are labeled as standard review, which means that they do not have increased 
therapeutic value.52 
2. Patent Theory and Practice: The Case of Drugs 
Pharmaceuticals have long been considered the one area where patents 
function in reality as they do in theory because drugs are expensive to
develop but easy to copy.53  In fact, there are a number of studies by 
economists frequently cited by scholars to underscore the importance of 
patent protection and sometimes to argue for increasing patent or related
protection.54 
Because a patent permits a company to legally exclude all others from 
making or selling the identical drug,55 pharmaceutical companies mostly 
rely on patents to protect their investment in new drugs and to maintain a 
50. Applications designed for priority review are evaluated in six months, rather 
than the ten months for standard reviews. See, e.g., SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS22814, FDA FAST TRACK AND PRIORITY REVIEW PROGRAMS 3 (2008).  There is an even
faster track given to the most highly valued drugs that address “serious or life-threatening 
disease[s],” which are a subset of the priority review drugs; however, those are not addressed 
here because studies do not focus on this much smaller subset.  21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2012).
Moreover, some have questioned whether the current categorization is even appropriate. See,
e.g., Courtney Davis & John Abraham, Rethinking Innovation Accounting in Pharmaceutical 
Regulation: A Case Study in the Deconstruction of Therapeutic Advance and Therapeutic
Breakthrough, 36 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 791, 808–10 (2011). 
51. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANUAL
OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6020.3, at 6–7 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/down 
Loads/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder/manualofpolicies 
procedures/ucm082000.pdf. 
52. See infra Part III.B. 
53. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 35–36. 
54.  See infra notes 235–36 and accompanying text. 




   
 





   
  
   
















   
    
 
 






competitive advantage.56 Of course, competitors may sell a drug that aims
to treat the same condition, such as minimizing heartburn.  However, the 
ability to exclude others from making the patented drug generally permits
the patent-owning company to sell its drug at a substantial premium.
This is true even when there are two or more drugs that treat the same
condition in the same way; each drug is usually priced at a substantial
premium in contrast to a generic drug.57 
The importance of patent protection to the business model of
pharmaceutical companies is readily underscored by the fact that when
patent protection for a given drug ends and there is robust competition 
from multiple generic companies, the price of the drug drops substantially.58 
56. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 35–36. 
57. Although patented drugs may cost somewhat less when there are more drugs
in the same class, so long as a drug is under patent protection, it still sells for much more
than a generic version.  See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION 
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 14–15 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf.  One study noted discounts of “at least 5%” for some drugs, but
no discounts at all for one drug.  JOSEPH A. DIMASI, PRICE TRENDS FOR PRESCRIPTION 
PHARMACEUTICALS: 1995-1999 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drug-
papers/dimassi/dimasi-final.htm.
58. The first generic may be twenty-five percent lower, whereas with multiple 
generics, the price can fall to one-fifth of the initial generic price.  E.g., Panos Kanavos 
et al., Competition in Off-Patent Drug Markets: Issues, Regulation and Evidence, 23 
ECON. POL’Y 499, 505 (2008).  The price of the brand drug post patent, on the other 
hand, tends to actually increase to focus on consumers who are price insensitive.  E.g., 
Dong-Churl Suh et al., Effect of Multiple-Source Entry on Price Competition After Patent
Expiration in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 35 HEALTH SERV. RES. 529, 529 (2000).  Of 
course, these numbers reflect the situation in the U.S. market, but do not necessarily
apply in all markets.  Consider India, where there are only a small number of consumers 
that can pay the price of a branded drug, even the first generic drug is typically priced at
a much steeper margin because otherwise there would be inadequate sales for the generic 
company to make a profit.  For example, Bayer was selling a patented cancer drug
marketed as Nexavar in India for over $5000 a month, but the first generic manufacturer 
sold the drug for only $125 a month—a drop in price of about seventy-five percent. 
Naazneen Karmali, Indian Tycoon Slashes Costs of Cancer Drugs, Claims More
Humanitarian Impact than Gates, Buffett Combined, FORBES (June 12, 2012, 3:58 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/naazneenkarmali/2012/06/12/ciplas-new-battle. This situation 
is slightly different in that the generic manufacturer was permitted to make the drug
during the patent term pursuant to a compulsory license.  See Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer
Corp., C.L.A. No. 1/2011 (Controller of Patents, Mumbai, Mar. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_12032012.pdf, aff’d, Bayer Corp.
v. Union of India, QA/35/2012/PT/MUM (Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai,
Mar. 4, 2013), available at http://www.gnaipr.com/CaseLaws/OA352012PTMUM.pdf
(affirming the compulsory license but modifying the royalty rate); see also Vikas Bajaj
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For example, the price of the first HIV therapy was originally about 
$10,000, but today it is only about $100 because of substantial generic 
competition.59 In addition, generic competition that results in a price drop 
can happen quickly after patent expiration.60  Indeed, in recent years,
many industry sympathizers, policymakers, and even the popular press have 
discussed the “patent cliff” that many companies were facing with the 
simultaneous expiration of a number of patents, which was predicted to
have a substantial and serious impact on the sales of major pharmaceutical
companies.61 
Company revenues are substantially impacted when a patent on a
blockbuster drug expires. This is because the current business models of 
most companies primarily rely on a handful of blockbuster drugs for the 
majority of their profits,62 such that expiration of a single patent will
13, 2012, at B2.  However, it nonetheless indicates that it is possible to have more
dramatic price drops with a single generic entrant in a country where consumers cannot 
afford a more modest price drop.  Nonetheless, some still suggest that the dramatically
lower prices are still too high for many Indian consumers.  See, e.g., Nirmalya “Nemo”
Dutta, Despite Compulsory Licensing, Generic Cancer Drug Too Costly for the Poor,
HEALTHSITE (Mar. 21, 2012, 9:18 AM), http://health.india.com/diseases-conditions/despite- 
compulsory-licensing-generic-cancer-drug-too-costly-for-the-poor. 
59. See, e.g., MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF 
ANTIRETROVIRAL PRICE REDUCTIONS 2 (16th ed. 2013). 
60. E.g., Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 83–85 (1997); Henry G. Grabowski &
John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals After 
the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331, 335–37 (1992). 
61. See, e.g., TONY HARRIS ET AL., IP AUSTL., PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS REVIEW 
13 (2013) (citing Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the 
“Patent Cliff,” U.S. PHARMACIST GENERIC DRUG REVIEW SUPPLEMENT, June 2012, at 
12), available at http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/2013-05-27_PPR_Final_Report.pdf
[hereinafter AUSTRALIAN REPORT]; Charlotte Harrison, The Patent Cliff Steepens, 10
NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 12, 12–13 (2011); Katie Thomas, U.S. Drug Costs 
Dropped in 2012, but Rises Loom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2013, at A1 (noting the “patent 
cliff” with respect to blockbuster drugs such as Lipitor and Plavix that lost patent
protection in recent years).  Branded drugs with annual sales of $32.2 billion in 2011 lost 
patent protection in 2012, leaving those revenues exposed to cheap generics. 
EVALUATEPHARMA, BIOTECH AND PHARMA 2012 YEAR IN REVIEW 20 (2013), available at 
http://info.evaluatepharma.com/rs/evaluatepharmaltd/images/EPV_Review_2012.pdf. 
62. See, e.g., PHRMA, DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION:
THE NEED TO MAINTAIN STRONG AND PREDICTABLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 





     












   




      






substantially reduce their profits.63  In addition, generics aggressively 
compete on price upon entering the market, such that blockbuster sales can
quickly erode in a matter of months after a patent expires.  One famous
example is that when the patent on Eli Lilly’s antidepressant Prozac
expired, it lost over seventy percent of market share in less than six 
months.64 
Not only are patents an essential tool for the protection of drugs, they 
also have an impact on what types of drugs are developed.65  Importantly,
patent law gives the same term of exclusivity for every drug—whether a
breakthrough drug or a more modest drug with no increased therapeutic
potential over existing drugs. The more modest drugs may be less costly
and time intensive to develop; although this is seldom discussed, what
limited data that does exist suggests that such drugs cost about a third of 
what a truly new chemical compound would cost to develop.66  Accordingly,
it would seem logical that companies focus primarily on incremental
innovations; indeed, as will be discussed, the vast majority of drugs are 
the product of incremental innovations, and the proportion of such drugs 
is increasing.67 
B. The Existence and Importance of Schemas 
Research in cognitive science and behavioral economics has repeatedly 
shown that all individuals are subject to cognitive biases in how they
acquire and process information.68  Although flawed decisions may be 
troubling, these mental shortcuts are nonetheless useful to help individuals 
63. See Barbara J. Williams, A Prescription for Anxiety: An Analysis of Three Brand-
Name Drug Companies and Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1, 1 (2005). 
64. Druss et al., supra note 34, at 211. 
65. There are of course other potential factors that impact drug development. For 
example, whether an insurance company or Medicare is likely to reimburse for a drug 
could potentially also impact innovation.  However, discussion of these issues is beyond
the focus of this Article.
66. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2589, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21 (2006) [hereinafter CBO STUDY] (citing Richard G. Frank,
New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 325, 327 (2003) (noting 
CMR International’s 2002 estimate that product line extensions account for thirty percent of
research and development, and PhRMA’s 1999 estimate that they account for “about 
eighteen percent” of R&D expenditures)). Notably, this information is limited and dated. 
67. See infra Part III.B. 
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process information efficiently and effectively.69  For example, when 
faced with a dangerous situation, whether it is an impending car crash or
a poisonous snake, it is valuable to be able to act quickly and instinctively.
The problem, however, is that the same mental shortcuts that enable us 
to engage in self-protectionism in the face of real danger also play a role
in situations where we should be more objective. Although most 
individuals recognize that there may be judgment flaws active in others, 
most individuals assume that they are immune from such flaws, thus
compounding the problem.70  This Part provides fundamental background 
on the science of social cognition that is essential to understanding the
argument in Part IV that there are currently flaws in prevailing thinking 
about pharmaceutical innovation and the role of patents. 
1. Individuals and Groups View Information Through Schemas 
One type of cognitive bias is a world view through which an individual 
interprets information.71  For example, someone may have a general world
view that government regulation is bad.  A corporation that does not want
government regulation could be expected to have this view; this world 
view may extend beyond immediate self-interest to color all views of 
government regulation, even when not directly applicable to the corporation.72 
Although the term schema may be unfamiliar to some, there are schemas 
that are commonly known.  For example, a racial stereotype—the
generalized views about a particular race—is a schema.73  There are
also other common schemas, such as the schema that lawyers are
mercenaries, women are shoppers, or men are resistant to relationships.74 
Academics have been shown to have a schema that favors complexity, 
which results in perceiving articles that use more complex language to
be superior.75 Although some known schemas, such as racial stereotypes,
69. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 1; Categorically Biased, supra note 19, at 1128. 
70. See, e.g., Categorically Biased, supra note 19, at 1223; see also infra note 76 
(describing this phenomenon as “naïve realism” and providing sources). 
71. See, e.g., Categorically Biased, supra note 19, at 1143. 
72. See, e.g., The Illusion of Law, supra note 19, at 87–89. 
73. See, e.g., Categorically Biased, supra note 19, at 1165–66. 
74. See, e.g., id. at 1111–12; The Illusion of Law, supra note 19, at 87–89. 
75. See, e.g., J. Scott Armstrong, Unintelligible Management Research and Academic 

















   
   
  
 
    
 
 
   
 
     




     
       
    
  
are considered to be bad, schemas are in fact adaptive behaviors for
dealing with a world that is highly saturated with information.  Essentially,
schemas help all individuals and entities make a complex world more
manageable.
2. Schemas Are Maintained Through Confirmation Bias 
a. Seeing What We Want To See: Confirmation Bias 
A major element of cognitive bias is the fact that individuals not only
seek information that is consistent with their preexisting schemas but
also neglect or reject disconfirming evidence.76  In other words, there is 
a natural tendency to seek and process information to confirm what we
believe we know, resulting in a confirmation bias.  For example, many
individuals choose to watch Fox News or MSNBC to hear information
that is consistent with their views.77 
Although confirmation bias may seem like a major mental flaw, it can
be considered a sensible shortcut to permit individuals to make sense of 
a vast array of information.  For example, when information is ambiguous
and could be susceptible to different interpretations, confirmation bias
helps individuals to confirm an existing view.  Indeed, studies show that
had a bias toward more complex language that resulted in rating more complex discussions
as superior in quality); Donald H. Naftulin et al., The Doctor Fox Lecture: A Paradigm 
of Educational Seduction, 48 J. MED. EDUC. 630, 633–34 (1973) (discussing a study in
which a highly charismatic actor posing as an academic was rated as a good teacher by
educators, even though he was espousing gibberish). 
76. This may be compounded by a phenomenon called naïve realism in which 
individuals assume they are objective and only others are biased. See, e.g., Emily Pronin, 
Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 
37, 39–40 (2006); Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent
Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 781–82 (2004); Robert J.
Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in
Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404 (1995). 
For example, in the 2012 presidential election, some Republicans assumed Nate Silver 
was biased, and thus, his data predicting an Obama win was suspect. See Nate Silver,
When Internal Polls Mislead, a Whole Campaign May Be To Blame, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Dec. 1, 2012, 6:01 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/when-
internal-polls-mislead-a-whole-campaign-may-be-to-blame.
77. See Stephan Lewandowsky et al., Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued 
Influence and Successful Debiasing, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 106, 111 (2012); see also
Heather L. LaMarre et al., The Irony of Satire: Political Ideology and the Motivation To See
What You Want To See in The Colbert Report, 14 INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 212, 222–23 (2009)
(suggesting conservatives believe political satirist Stephen Colbert is sincere whereas liberals
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someone with a preexisting belief is likely to maintain that belief out of
proportion with its correctness, and possibly even after later information 
reveals that the initial belief was incorrect.78  Psychologists explain that 
people are motivated to discredit or ignore inconsistent information to
reduce or prevent psychological distress that might otherwise result by
dissonance—a phenomenon called “cognitive dissonance.”79 
There are a number of studies that document how confirmation bias 
impacts how individuals evaluate research results and whether they are 
persuaded. In particular, confirmation bias may make individuals more 
critical of studies that contradict their schemas and less likely to be
persuaded by such studies.80  This is important to understanding PhRMA’s
criticisms of studies that challenge its world view, as will be discussed in
Part III. 
Studies have shown that preconceptions, such as schemas, impact the 
perceived accuracy of studies, as well as whether they are persuasive.81 
One classic study concerns subjects that were preselected based on their 
preference for or against capital punishment and were then provided mock 
studies that reached opposite conclusions concerning whether capital
punishment deterred crime.82  Subjects were more critical of research 
methods inconsistent with their beliefs, citing issues such as insufficient 
sample size, nonrandom sample selection, or absence of control for key
78. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 169 (1980). 
79. E.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–3 (1957).
80. The confirmation bias impact may be relevant not only to schemas but also to 
information that is simply inconsistent with a self-interest bias.  For example, studies have
shown that subjects given positive feedback on supposed intelligence tests or social sensitivity
tests are more likely to view those tests as valid. See Tom Pyszczynski et al., Maintaining 
Consistency Between Self-Serving Beliefs and Available Data: A Bias in Information 
Evaluation, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 179, 186 (1985); see also Peter H. 
Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria for
Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 574–76
(1992) (concluding that subjects given a fictional medical test for a supposedly dangerous 
deficiency were more likely to scrutinize the test if they tested positive for the problem). 
81. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: 
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979). 












   
   
   
 
 








variables.83  Similar effects have been found on a broad range of issues, 
such as health risks,84 the safety of nuclear power, bans on gays in the
military, and theories regarding the John F. Kennedy assassination.85 
Doctors, who are generally assumed to be objective, are also not 
immune to confirmation bias.  Studies indicate that doctors tend to generate 
an early hypothesis that impacts subsequent information gathering and 
may result in a faulty diagnosis.86  Some prominent doctors have been 
susceptible to an assumption that forty to fifty percent of patients are 
resistant to the off-patent and cheap treatment of aspirin as a diuretic, 
perhaps consistent with a belief that newer drugs are better, when in fact,
a recent study shows that there was no justification at all for this belief.87 
Scientists are also not immune to confirmation bias.  As noted recently, 
“[s]cientists are humans, and they’re susceptible to confirmation bias too.”88 
83. Id. at 2103; cf. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 480, 490 (1990) (noting that study subjects with high caffeine consumption were 
likely to disbelieve an article that supposedly correlated caffeine with a serious disease 
and consider the research less sound). 
84. See, e.g., Harold H. Kassarjian & Joel B. Cohen, Cognitive Dissonance and
Consumer Behavior: Reactions to the Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health, 
8 CAL. MGMT. REV. 55, 63 (1965) (concluding that smokers were motivated to disregard
evidence of the health risks of smoking); Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving 
Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
636, 644 (1987) (concluding that heavy caffeine drinkers were more skeptical than low 
caffeine drinkers about an article that alleged caffeine risks). 
85. Geoffrey D. Munro et al., Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: 
Evaluating the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate, 24 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSCYHOL. 15, 16
(2002) (citing studies). 
86. See, e.g., Elke U. Weber et al., Determinants of Diagnostic Hypothesis
Generation: Effects of Information, Base Rates, and Experience, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 1151, 1151–52 (1993). 
87. See Tilo Grosser et al., Drug Resistance and Pseudoresistance: An Unintended
Consequence of Enteric Coating Aspirin, 127 CIRCULATION 377, 382–83 (2013); Katie
Thomas, Study Raises Questions on Coating of Aspirin, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at B1. 
88. Anahad O’Connor, Myths Surround Breakfast and Weight, N.Y. TIMES WELL 
BLOG (Sept 10, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/myths-
surround-breakfast-and-weight (quoting Dr. David B. Allison, Director of the Nutrition 
Obesity Research Center at the University of Alabama at Birmingham); see also Daniel 
Engber, Cuckoo for Cocoa Puffs: Why Are We So Sure That Breakfast Is the Most
Important Meal of the Day?, SLATE (Sept. 9, 2013, 1:20 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2013/09/breakfast_and_weight_loss_is_it
_really_the_most_important_meal_of_the_day.1.html (noting that University of Minnesota 
researcher Mark Pereira commented that the “scientific dogma” is a result of people just 
wanting to be “right,” even when not influenced by the private sector or politicians but 
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Recently, a study debunked the popular conception among not only lay
people but also scientists and even the Surgeon General that eating 
breakfast is important for weight loss and control.89  The study found that 
there have only been a handful of rigorous trials, and even among those,
the findings have often been misrepresented.90  For example, a seminal
1992 study with mixed results was misinterpreted in fifty subsequent
articles, with the majority improperly relying on the study to suggest that
eating breakfast protects against weight gain.91  Similarly, a 2002 study
reporting a correlation between people who lost weight and those who
ate breakfast was over-extrapolated by the majority of subsequent citing 
articles to suggest that breakfast will result in weight loss.92  Even famous 
scientists are not immune.  For example, Robert Millikan published a Nobel 
Prize-winning work concerning electron charges but only published
about half of his observations and omitted those that did not fit his 
hypothesis.93 
This phenomenon is very important because studies show that even 
when individuals aim to be objective and are given rewards for accuracy 
in experimental settings, they are nonetheless subject to confirmation bias.94 
The problems of confirmation bias are thus likely to be most problematic 
in situations where there is not only no reward for accuracy but also self-
interest at play. 
N.Y TIMES, Feb. 2, 2014, at SR 12 (providing examples of confirmation bias impacting 
NASA funded researchers, as well as scientists involved in landmark cancer studies).
89. See Andrew W. Brown et al., Belief Beyond the Evidence: Using the Proposed
Effect of Breakfast on Obesity To Show 2 Practices That Distort Scientific Evidence, 98 
AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1298, 1307 (2013).  The Surgeon General asserts that eating
a “sensible meal” for breakfast may be important to achieving and maintaining a healthy
weight. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON 
GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY  (2001),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44206/pdf/TOC.pdf. 
90. See Brown et al., supra note 89, at 1301. 
91. See id. at 1304. 
92. Id. 
93. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 194 (1998); see also Suk-Young Chwe, supra note 
88, at SR 12 (noting that Millikan’s own lab notebooks had comments, such as “Best yet
– Beauty – Publish,” which indicated that he excluded inconsistent data). 
94. See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial 


















    
 
 
   











   
     
  
   
b. Schemas Are Resistant To Change 
Confirmation bias is difficult to combat.95  In particular, when presented 
with ambiguous or inconsistent information, sometimes this reinforces,
rather than eliminates, preexisting beliefs.96  Studies repeatedly show 
that individuals have a motivation to retain existing beliefs that results in
the entrenchment of existing beliefs when faced with ambiguous or contrary 
information.  In the previously noted study where subjects received 
different “evidence” about the deterrent effects of capital punishment,
subjects became more entrenched in their views.97  The same effect was 
found in a study concerning the impact of a fictitious report concerning 
religious resurrection; after reading the same report, believers increased
the intensity of their belief, whereas nonbelievers became more skeptical.98 
Not only does confirmation bias exist with ambiguous evidence but
certain tools that most would expect to minimize such bias may not be 
helpful or even further reinforce the belief.  Increased education does not
immunize individuals from the effects of confirmation bias.99  In addition,
providing reasoning to support a position may reinforce, rather than
eliminate, confirmation bias.100  Moreover, even after information is
discredited, it may continue to be believed—and especially so if individuals
provide a written explanation.101 
95. Some studies suggest that confirmation bias may be reduced in experimental
settings through techniques such as requiring subjects to consider an alternative possibility or
first portray themselves in a positive way before encountering disconfirming evidence. 
See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social 
Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1231 (1984); David K. Sherman & 
Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction
of Defensive Biases, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 119, 119, 122 (2002).  However, 
such techniques have limited applicability to real world situations. 
96. See, e.g., Sahara Byrne & Philip S. Hart, The Boomerang Effect: A Synthesis
of Findings and a Preliminary Theoretical Framework, in 33 COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 3 
(Christina S. Beck ed., 2009); Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail:
The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 323 (2010). 
97. Lord et al., supra note 81, at 2105. 
98. C. Daniel Batson, Rational Processing or Rationalization?: The Effect of
Disconfirming Information on a Stated Religious Belief, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 176, 176 (1975). 
99. Lewandowsky et al., supra note 77, at 120.
 100. See Shelly Chaiken & Suzanne Yates, Affective-Cognitive Consistency and
Thought-Induced Attitude Polarization, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1470, 1470, 
1477 (1985) (concluding that subjects who had an initial strong view on either capital 
punishment or censorship developed a stronger view after writing an essay on the topic). 
101. See Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of
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Although the persistence of bias in the face of contrary evidence may 
seem irrational, there is a psychological explanation.  Humans are motivated 
to make sense of their environment, and the motivation can also result in 
motivated reasoning to support an initial belief.  In other words, the same 
psychological processes at play for confirmation bias also result in the
persistence of these biases.
C. Schemas Can Propagate to Those Who Are Not Initially       
Interested in the Schemas 
This Part explains how cognitive biases of individuals, such as scholars
and policymakers, may make them susceptible to being influenced by 
the schemas of others.  In particular, this Part focuses on how cognitive
biases related to repetition of information, as well as biases that function 
in evaluating the content of that information, are influential.  This is an
important foundation for schemas that have been extensively repeated by 
the industry, as documented in greater detail in Part IV. 
1. Repetition of Schemas Makes Them Seem Real 
Most people would not be surprised to hear that repetition is important.
After all, we know that marketing campaigns as well as teachers rely on 
repetition to reinforce messages and learning.  This subpart goes beyond 
basic intuitions to explain how and why repetition is powerful. 
Why is repetition so powerful?  Some have suggested that when
information is repeated, that information is more readily remembered.102 
Accordingly, repeated information is presumed to be true—this has been
shown with trivia, rumors, false news stories, and marketing claims.103 
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1045 (1980); Lee Ross et al., Social Explanation and Social Expectation:
Effects of Real and Hypothetical Explanations on Subjective Likelihood, 35 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 825–26 (1977). 
102. This is referred to as the availability heuristic or fluency effect. E.g., KAHNEMAN, 
supra note 1, at 129–35. 
103. See, e.g., Floyd H. Allport & Milton Lepkin, Wartime Rumors of Waste and 
Special Privilege: Why Some People Believe Them, 40 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 3, 
7–8 (1945); Frederick T. Bacon, Credibility of Repeated Statements: Memory for Trivia, 
5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 241, 241–42 (1979); Scott A. 
Hawkins et al., Low-Involvement Learning: Repetition and Coherence in Familiarity and

























    
  
  
      
  
   
  
  






   
 
The repeated information is often better remembered than its source.104 
In addition, when the source is not recalled, repeated information is 
considered more likely to come from a credible source105 or to be widely
believed.106  In studies, subjects are inclined to assume repeated statements
are true, even where explicitly told that repeated statements are no more
likely than unrepeated statements to be true,107 or that the source of the
information is likely to be biased.108  The impact of repetition is also 
particularly powerful when subjects either lack the motivation or the 
opportunity to scrutinize the validity of the message.109  This has important
implications for certain schemas repeatedly stated by the pharmaceutical
industry—even though many consumers are skeptical about the industry
as a whole, they may nonetheless be influenced by repeated industry
claims and lack the motivation or even aptitude to carefully evaluate the 
information.110 
In addition, although some studies attempt to debunk claims, the format
in which they do so may ironically serve to simply reinforce the original 
message.  In particular, studies show that when information is presented
in a myth versus fact format, the myth may be reinforced, rather than
104. See Danielle C. Polage, Making Up History: False Memories of Fake News
Stories, 8 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 245, 248–49 (2012). 
105. See Alison R. Fragale & Chip Heath, Evolving Informational Credentials: The 
(Mis)Attribution of Believable Facts to Credible Sources, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 225, 225–26 (2004).  In addition, subjects presented with information consistent
with their existing schemas are especially likely to believe that the information is from a
credible source. Id.
 106. See Kimberlee Weaver et al., Inferring the Popularity of an Opinion from Its
Familiarity: A Repetitive Voice Can Sound Like a Chorus, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSCYHOL. 821, 821–22 (2007). 
107. See, e.g., Linda A. Henkel & Mark E. Mattson, Reading Is Believing: The Truth
Effect and Source Credibility, 20 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 1705, 1705–06 (2011);
see also Bacon, supra note 103, at 241, 251 (showing that repeated statements are more
likely to be judged as true, whereas contrary statements are likely to be viewed as false).
108. See Charles H. Cho et al., Astroturfing Global Warming: It Isn’t Always Greener 
on the Other Side of the Fence, 104 J. BUS. ETHICS 571, 581 (2011). 
109. See Scott A. Hawkins & Stephen J. Hoch, Low-Involvement Learning: Memory
Without Evaluation, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 212, 212–13 (1992). 
110. See, e.g., 84% Americans Blame Big Pharma for Healthcare Mess, ALLIANCE 
FOR HUMAN RES. PROTECTION (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.ahrp.org/cms/content/view/ 
636/94 (stating that a vast majority of Americans consider companies to engage in price
gouging); Huge Improvement in Reputation of the Auto Industry and Big Drop in Reputation of
Airlines, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 21 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/huge-
improvement-in-reputation-of-the-auto-industry-and-big-drop-in-reputation-of-airlines-13025 
7338.html (demonstrating that whereas the majority of consumers thought the drug industry
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challenged—as quickly as fifteen minutes after the repetition— even
though subjects could initially distinguish the myth from fact.111 
2. Compelling Stories That Are Repeated Are 
Especially Memorable 
Repetition is clearly powerful on its own, but the content of what is
repeated also has independent power.112  People are influenced by
compelling stories, which are generally simple and coherent, rather than
abstract. Individuals are persuaded by compelling stories because a 
good story seems reasonable. So, what makes a good story?  In addition 
to being simple and coherent, emotional content plays a role.  This 
should seem intuitively clear because vivid information is impactful and 
persuasive—a known fact effectively utilized by journalists and speakers.
Studies have shown that information with higher emotional content is
more likely to be remembered, believed, and disseminated, even if there
is no factual foundation.113  For example, stories about how vaccines injure
children have more resonance than information about how vaccines are not
injurious.114  Similarly, studies consistently show that people assume that
111. See, e.g., Ian Skurnik et al., How Warnings About False Claims Become 
Recommendations, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 713, 714 (2004); Norbert Schwarz, Metacognitive 
Experiences in Consumer Judgment and Decision Making, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 
332, 339 (2004) (showing the same phenomenon after a three day delay); see also
Lewandowsky et al., supra note 77, at 115 (explaining how repetition results in fluency,
which strengthens information in memory and presumed correctness). 
112. For example, information with strong fear appeal is more likely to produce a 
high level of susceptibility and to be more persuasive than information with low or weak
fear appeal. Kim Witte & Mike Allen, A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for 
Effective Public Health Campaigns, 27 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 591, 591 (2000).  The 
impact of such fear appeal is stronger for those with no prior knowledge. Joshua
M. Averbeck et al., Prior Knowledge and Health Messages: An Examination of Affect as 
Heuristics and Information as Systematic Processing for Fear Appeals, 76 S. COMM. J.
35, 35 (2011). 
113. See, e.g., Ellen M. Cotter, Influence of Emotional Content and Perceived
Relevance on Spread of Urban Legends: A Pilot Study, 102 PSYCHOL. REP. 623, 623 
(2008); Chip Heath et al., Emotional Selection In Memes: The Case Of Urban Legends, 
81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1028, 1028 (2001). 
114. See Martin G. Myers & Diego Pineda, Misinformation About Vaccines, in
VACCINES FOR BIODEFENSE AND EMERGING AND NEGLECTED DISEASES 255–56 (Alan D.T.
Barrett & Lawrence R. Stanberry eds., 2009); James M. Pribble et al., Medical News for 





















   
    




   
 
   
 
more high profile events occur with greater frequency than they do 
because they are publicized more and thus more “available” for recall.115 
Accordingly, people may be more fearful of terrorist attacks or shootings 
in public schools than car accidents, even though statistically, a car
accident is much more likely to occur.116 
III. REVEALING THREE KEY SCHEMAS IMPACTING 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
As noted in the introduction, there are three key schemas that deserve 
recognition and attention: the cost schema, the innovation schema, and
the strong patent schema.  Under the cost schema, the industry frequently
touts a certain number as the average cost to develop all drugs, when the
number is at best the highest number for a small fraction of drugs.117  To
justify the high costs—and sales price of drugs—the innovation schema 
suggests that the industry produces highly innovative drugs, when in fact,
the majority of drugs are not.118  Both of these schemas fuel the final
schema that strong, or perhaps stronger, patent protection is necessary in
light of high costs to produce innovation that is presumably of great 
benefit to society.119 
These schemas are distinct, yet they may reinforce each other and may 
also be tied to the general self interest of companies as well as scholars. 
Most individuals have a natural tendency to view themselves in a 
positive light.120 Thus, a company, comprised of individuals, would be
115. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 137–45; STUART SUTHERLAND, 
IRRATIONALITY: WHY WE DON’T THINK STRAIGHT! 16–17 (1994). One commentator has 
suggested that this basic principle is capitalized on by casinos that reinforce wins with
blinking lights and the loud noise of coins dropping, as opposed to the absolute silence 
that comes with losses, such that there is a perception of more wins.  JOHN ALLEN PAULOS,
INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 44 (2001). 
116. Some suggest that this can be explained by the fact that examples are more 
available psychologically and easier to grasp than statistical information. See, e.g., 
KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 137–45. 
117. See infra Part III.A. 
118. See infra Part III.B. 
119. See infra Part III.C. 
120. See, e.g., Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How
Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,
77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1121 (1999); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less 
Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 
(1981). This tendency is so strong that there is a radio show based on this premise— 
National Public Radio has a show called A Prairie Home Companion, which features the 
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naturally inclined to believe that it is doing valuable work—the innovation
schema—and also that it needs more protection to address costs—the
strong patent and cost schemas.  In addition, some patent and economic 
scholars may be more prone to the strong patent schema because the 
pharmaceutical industry is generally held out as the one case where 
patents actually work as intended, such that this schema would seem 
consistent with existing beliefs.121  Although it may seem inconsistent
with the concept of scholarly research to have bias, there is historical
evidence showing that even famous scientists have been biased against 
facts that do not match their theories, such that scholars in other areas
would not seem to be immune.122  In addition, studies repeatedly show
that a wide variety of highly educated professionals not only have cognitive 
biases but can be overly confident in their judgments.123 
This subpart explains how the schemas that impact industry as well as 
some scholars have been maintained and perpetuated through cognitive 
biases. The schemas are discussed in the order of complexity, beginning 
with the cost schema, followed by the innovation and strong patent
schemas.
looking, and all the children are above average.” A Prairie Home Companion, AMERICAN 
PUBLIC MEDIA, http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/about/podcast (last visited May 20, 
2014).  The same effect is true with groups.  See, e.g., Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril,
They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130–32 (1954) 
(showing that group allegiances to a team result in viewing controversial calls in favor of
group affiliation); Robert P. Vallone et al., The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased 
Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577, 577 (1985) (finding that pro-Arab and pro-Israeli 
students watching the same news coverage of a massacre of civilians viewed the coverage as
consistent with their preexisting schemas). 
121. See MERGES, supra note 3, at 282 and accompanying text. 
122. See, e.g., Nickerson, supra note 93, at 194. 
123. See, e.g., Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the 
Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 411–12 (1992); John B. Kidd, 
The Utilization of Subjective Probabilities in Production Planning, 34 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA
338, 340–41 (1970); John W. Loop & Lee B. Lusted, American College of Radiology 
Diagnostic Efficacy Studies, AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 173, 175 (1978); Stuart Oskamp,
Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 261, 261 (1965).
For discussions of lawyers, see Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: 
Lawyers’ Ability To Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 133 
(2010); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Predictions of Success, 28







   
 
    
   
     
  
 
   
  




    
  
 
     














A. The Cost Schema 
A dominant schema is that the average cost124 to develop every drug
exceeds $1 billion.125  PhRMA asserts on its website that the “average
[cost] of $1.2 billion” makes patent protection crucial.126  Similarly, an
April 2012 statement by PhRMA to Congress concerning the importance
124. This subpart focuses primarily on the perpetuation of this schema in academic
and policy circles; although the schema clearly pervades general interest articles such as 
newspapers, scholars and policymakers are generally expected to be more thorough in 
their evaluation and consideration of information. In addition, there is a related schema—that
the average time it takes to develop a new drug is fifteen years—that parallels this 
discussion with respect to the fact that this figure is only for new molecular entities but is 
frequently noted as the average for all drugs and taken as an uncontested fact that needs
no support. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT:
SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS 
HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 6 (2006). Even those that are skeptical of the 
industry may still repeat this figure without citation.  E.g., FINKELSTEIN & TEMIN, supra
note 8, at 66. 
125. E.g., PHRMA, 2013 BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY PROFILE 38 
(2013) (citing DiMasi & Grabowsi, infra note 128, at 469), available at http://www.phrma.
org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMA%20Profile%202013.pdf.  A Forbes article recently cited 
the even higher average number of $4 billion, but this number is not based on any empirical 
research and has not yet become broadly cited, such that it is not considered in this subpart.
Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES, Feb. 10,
2012, at 38, 38.  In addition, a recent U.K. study cites a cost consistent with this schema 
that also is based solely on NMEs, rather than the development cost of all drugs.  JORGE 
MESTRE-FERRANDIZ ET AL., OFFICE OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, THE R&D COST OF A NEW
MEDICINE 11–12 (2012). Thus far, the study has only been cited a few times and
mentioned on a few blogs.  E.g., TONY HOCKLEY, CIVITAS POLICY ANALYSIS CTR., ONE 
SMALL STEP FOR THE NHS, BUT ONE GIANT LEAP FOR ITS PRINCIPLES? 4 (2013), available 
at http://civitas.org.uk/pdf/Hockley_One_Small_Step_NHS.pdf; Julian Clark, Traversing
the Valley of Death, in  HEALTHCARE: REFORM OR RATION 68 (2013), available at
http://www.ceda.com.au/media/302619/healthcarefinal1.pdf; Adam Hill, R&D Costs Rise
Ten-Fold, PHARMAFILE (Apr. 12, 2012, 9:23 AM), http://www.pharmafile.com/news/ 
176314/rd-costs-rise-ten-fold; Glyn Moody, Bayer Fights India’s Compulsory Licensing 
of Cancer Drug By Claiming It Spent $2.5 Billion Developing It, TECHDIRT (Feb. 4,
2013, 5:40 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130123/07494121762/bayer-fights-indias-
compulsory-licensing-cancer-drug-claiming-it-spent-25-billion-developing-it.shtml (quoting
report from advocate Jamie Love with respect to Bayer’s reliance on a U.K. Office of
Health Economics (OHE) report and noting that the OHE is not part of the government but an 
industry-funded firm).  The U.K. study is not addressed separately, but the same considerations 
would likely apply because it mirrored the approach of the U.S. article in focusing exclusively 
on the cost of the most expensive drugs to develop and basing its findings on proprietary
data. See Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., supra, at 11. 
126. Intellectual Property Protections Are Vital to Continuing Innovation in the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/innovation/intellectual-property
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of patent protection in the international landscape also began by stating 
an average cost of over $1 billion.127 
The $1 billion figure can be traced to a 2007 study128 that updated a
2003 study that estimated the cost as exceeding $800 million.129  However,
the figure in the studies is only for NMEs, which are likely at most a
third of all new drugs, whereas the schema uses this figure as the average 
for all drugs.130  Importantly, two-thirds of all new drugs are incremental 
127. International Patent Issues: Promoting a Level Playing Field for American 
Industry Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and 
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7 (2012) (statement of Roy
Waldron, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, Pfizer, on behalf of PhRMA); see also
Hearing on U.S.-India Trade Relations: Opportunities and Challenges Before the 
Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (written
statement of Roy Waldron, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, Pfizer) (“[I]t takes on average 
more than $1 billion . . . to research and develop a new medicine.”). 
128. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical
R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 469, 475–76 (2007)
(reporting an average capitalized cost of $1.24 billion, with $559 million out of pocket 
costs per approved drug).  In addition, although a more recent study purports to confirm 
the 2003 number, it suffers from the same cost schema of focusing solely on NMEs.  See
Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development: Is
It Really $802 Million?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 420, 420–21 (2006); see also Mestre-Ferrandiz 
et al., supra note 125, at 11–12 (suggesting an estimate of $1.5 billion but still focusing 
solely on NME and also basing its estimate on proprietary data).
129. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003) [hereinafter DiMasi 2003, The
Price of Innovation] (reporting the capitalized cost of a new drug as $802 million); see 
also DiMasi et al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 107, 107 (1991) (reporting the capitalized cost of a new drug as $231 million in 
1987 dollars).
130. The one-third number is an approximation because the study does not provide 
adequate information to assess the number of NMEs in the years evaluated; the study
focuses on when clinical trials were initiated, whereas published data from the FDA 
focuses on the year of drug approval, which is generally later.  However, for years after
the clinical trials were initiated, the number of NMEs ranged from twenty-two percent to
thirty percent.  DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 128, at 474; Summary of NDA Approvals
and Receipts, 1938 to the Present, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/ProductRegulation/SummaryofNDAApprovalsReceipts1938tothepresent/default.
htm (last updated Jan. 18, 2013).  In addition, the Congressional Budget Office used the 
one-third number in its study. See CBO STUDY, supra note 66, at 15 n.28 (providing data that
about one-third of new drugs from 1990-2004 were NMEs).  Although the CBO study is 
somewhat dated, more recent articles state that the rate of new drug approvals is relatively
constant.  E.g., Munos, supra note 32, at 959, 961.  The most current information on FDA















    
 





   
  




    
 
drugs that are much cheaper to develop than NMEs, such that the 
schema distorts the cost of most drug development.131  Moreover, not
even all NMEs are represented by the schema.  Rather, the number only 
reflects the fraction of those NMEs that may be the most expensive.132 
In particular, the study only considered NMEs that were developed by
the same company from start to finish,133 whereas most new drugs are
the result of efforts initially made by others, such as academics, that a 
company then licenses.134 Although the study explains that this was 
done because of limitations in data collection, this important caveat is
never noted by PhRMA.  In addition, even for this sliver of NMEs, the 
number may not be accurate because of methodological issues, as 
discussed below.  Because of these significant limitations, these studies 
support only a small fraction of drugs and not the schema that every drug 
has the same costs. 
The first published criticism of the 2003 study was an article by 
Professors Light and Warburton, entitled Extraordinary Claims Require 
Extraordinary Evidence.135  Although these authors may be subject to
their own schema, the focus here is on illustrating confirmation bias for 
the cost schema because it is so widely accepted that most do not realize
it is a schema rather than an established fact.  In addition, although their 
critique addressed multiple issues, the discussion here focuses on those 
most pertinent to the cost schema.136 
basis at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.
ReportsMenu.
131. See supra note 130. 
132. See Donald W. Light & Rebecca N. Warburton, Extraordinary Claims Require 
Extraordinary Evidence, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 1030, 1031–32 (2005) [hereinafter Light & 
Warburton, Extraordinary Claims] (stating that the drugs studied are 3.7 times more
expensive than drugs licensed from other companies). 
133. See DiMasi 2003, The Price of Innovation, supra note 129, at 156 (noting that
the compounds were all “self-originated”). 
134. See, e.g., Robert Kneller, The Importance of New Companies for Drug Discovery:
Origins of a Decade of New Drugs, 9 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 867, 867, 879 (2010).
135. Light & Warburton, Extraordinary Claims, supra note 132; see also Roger
Collier, Drug Development Cost Estimates Hard to Swallow, 180 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N 
J. 279, 279 (2009) (describing the study).  There are also additional published criticisms, 
but because these largely relate to the same points, they are not included here.  However, 
for reference, see Donald W. Light, Reply to DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 33 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 325 (2008); Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing 
the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34 (2011) [hereinafter
Light & Warburton, Demythologizing].
136. E.g., Steve Morgan et al., The Cost of Drug Development: A Systematic
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Light and Warburton challenged the validity of the data because it
relied on confidential and proprietary data supplied by the industry.  In
particular, they questioned the validity of the number because the 
confidential data could not have been evaluated by independent parties.137 
They noted that it is impossible to know what the surveyed companies
counted as research costs and warned that the companies would, in fact, 
have an incentive to overstate the costs given that the companies understood 
the data would be used to estimate the costs of drug development.138  They
also noted that it is unclear how invited firms were selected, which casts
doubt on whether they were selected from all firms, or only ones that might 
have higher costs.139 
DiMasi et al.’s reply demonstrates confirmation bias concerning these
criticisms.140  DiMasi et al. asserted that “[t]here appears to be little
reason for firms to fabricate to achieve particular results when the 
acknowledged reality supports such basic claims” that drug discovery is 
“uniformly recognize[d as] on average . . . costly, risky, and lengthy.”141 
The statement may reflect confirmation bias in that it does not address
development costs).  Other issues not discussed include whether the figure should reflect 
capitalized cost, instead of solely out of pocket costs.  The capitalized cost includes the 
cost of not investing money that is used for research, rather than solely out of pocket costs.
Although a capitalized cost can result in a figure that is roughly twice as high as the out
of pocket costs—$1 billion versus $672 million in the study—that is not the primary focus of 
discussion here because standard accounting principles often use capitalized costs, although
some suggest that it is less clear whether this should apply to drug development. See, e.g., 
MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS 
239–40 (2004) (suggesting that application of accounting principles are not as clear as
PhRMA has claimed). In addition, some have criticized the figure for not excluding government 
subsidies and tax credits and for potentially including costs that are not required to develop
a drug, such as costs to help persuade doctors to prescribe a drug. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN,
RX R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG INDUSTRY’S R&D “SCARE CARD,” i (Frank
Clemente et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF.
137.  Light & Warburton, Extraordinary Claims, supra note 132, at 1031. 
138.  Id. 
 139. Id.
140. DiMasi et al. also evidence naïve realism in suggesting that Light and Warburton,
but not themselves, are biased.  For example, they claim that Light and Warburton failed
to address the “validation” of their results in alternative sources.  Joseph A. DiMasi et al.,
Reply: Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 1034,
1034 (2005). However, DiMasi et al. seem blind to considering whether their own “validation”
was completely objective.




















   
   







    
the critique. For example, even if it is acknowledged that drug discovery
is “costly,” that does not rebut the concern that companies have an incentive 
to overstate the costs. In addition, DiMasi et al. assert that companies
knew that the results would be subject to “validity checks,” such that 
companies would not be inclined to distort the data.142  However, the
validity checks would only be done by the authors of the study, who 
have a track record of publishing articles suggesting a high cost of drug 
discovery.143 
The cost schema is likely widely accepted due to extensive repetition. 
Importantly, the original $800 million estimate was first announced in a 
press release144 and was repeated by the press for more than a year145 
before the actual academic paper was published that disclosed the key 
details that could then be questioned. In other words, for more than a 
year, the public, as well as scholars, only heard the industry cost schema. 
Although the eventual paper disclosed that the average cost number was 
only for a fraction of most new drugs,146 there was no press coverage of 
the published paper, in contrast to the lavish press coverage of the 
original press release.147  In addition, the industry continues to propagate
the cost schema, which may be represented as fact by policymakers or
even scholars.148 
142. Id.
 143. See Donald W. Light & Rebecca N. Warburton, Setting the Record Straight in
the Reply by DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 1045, 1045–46 (2005). 
144. Press Release, Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Tufts Center for the 
Study of Drug Development Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million
(Nov. 30, 2001) (on file with author); see also Tufts Center: Average New Drug Costs 
$802 Million, BOS. BUS. J. (Nov. 30, 2001, 3:26 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/
stories/2001/11/26/daily48.html (stating that the press release announced that “the average
cost to develop a new prescription drug is $802 million”). 
145. E.g., Naomi Aoki, R&D Costs for Drugs Skyrocket, Study Says Tufts Center
Estimates Amount Up Threefold From a Decade Ago, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2001, at 
C1; Terence Chea, Low Fliers Behind the Drugs; Bioinformatics Firms, Essential to 
Research, Sag on Wall St., WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at E1; Andrew Pollack, Despite
Billions for Discoveries, Pipeline of Drugs is Far from Full, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002, 
at C1.
146.  DiMasi 2003, The Price of Innovation, supra note 129, at 158. 
147. A Lexis search for articles that mentioned the “Tufts” study or the published 
article in the two months after the DiMasi paper was published did not reveal any news 
stories. 
148. For example, a recent report in Australia noted that “[i]n their submission,
Medicines Australia quotes an average cost of $1.5 billion and 12 to 15 years to bring a 
new drug to market.”  AUSTRALIAN REPORT, supra note 61, at 33.  Although it is duly noted
who provides this cost figure, there is no contrary figure provided, or acknowledgment that 
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There is relatively little press coverage of information that contradicts 
the cost schema. For example, although Light and Warburton published 
a related article in 2011 challenging the cost schema,149 it received relatively 
little public media attention.150  In contrast, the cost schema was presented 
as an undisputed fact in a 2012 Wall Street Journal article,151 as well as
in a 2012 Forbes magazine article.152  Moreover, although a 2011 academic
study notes that there is, in fact, no “gold standard” concerning the cost
of drug discovery despite decades of research, this important finding has 
received virtually no press.153 
the report suggests that there is a consensus that the cost of drug development is rising and 
references a study by the UK Office of Health Economics that purports to support this. 
Id. at 37 (citing JORGE MESTRE-FERRANDIZ ET AL., supra note 125, at v). 
149.  Light & Warburton, Demythologizing, supra note 135, at 34. 
150. Timothy Noah, The Make-Believe Billion: How Drug Companies Exaggerate 
Research Costs To Justify Absurd Profits, SLATE (Mar. 3, 2011, 9:19 PM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/business/the_customer/2011/03/the_makebelieve_billion.html.  In addition,
there were a few blogs that reported it.  E.g., Derek Lowe, The Costs of Drug Research:
Beginning a Rebuttal, CORANTE BLOG (Mar. 7, 2011), http://pipeline.corante.com/archives/
2011/03/07/the_costs_of_drug_research_beginning_a_rebuttal.php; Scott Gavura, What Does
a New Drug Cost?, SCIENCE-BASED MEDICINE (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.science
basedmedicine.org/index.php/what-does-a-new-drug-cost; John Mack, A New Estimate of
Drug Development Cost, PHARMA MARKETING NEWS (Apr. 23, 2011), http://www.news.
pharma-mkting.com/pmn108-article03.htm; Jennifer Ringler, Fact Versus Fact: When Will
the Numbers Add Up?, PHARMAEXEC (Mar. 15, 2011), http://blog.pharmexec.com/2011/
03/15/fact-versus-fact-when-will-the-numbers-add-up.  Of course, there are some that question 
the cost schema without referring to academic sources. E.g., Mike Masnick, Drug Companies 
Overestimate Cost of Developing a New Drug by Merely $1.26 Billion, TECHDIRT (Mar.
30, 2011, 8:07 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110329/02440013670/drug-companies-
overestimate-cost-developing-new-drug- merely-126-billion.shtml. 
151. Josh Bloom, Should Patents on Pharmaceuticals Be Extended To Encourage 
Innovation?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424052970204542404577156993191655000  (“[B]ringing one new drug to market takes 
roughly 14 years, at a cost of about $1.3 billion.”). 
152. Herper, supra note 125, at 38. 
153. Morgan et al., supra note 136, at 11. Although not a reliable academic source,
Wikipedia does reflect common beliefs, and this study is notably missing in the references
listed for the cost of drug discovery. Drug Development, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Drug_development (last updated Apr. 27, 2014).  In addition, a 2012 study of 100
pages that aimed to be a comprehensive analysis of the cost of drug development did not cite 
this study.  JORGE MESTRE-FERRANDIZ ET AL., supra note 125, at 85 (lacking citation to
Morgan et al. in the list of references).  This could be because this study is a review of prior












    
   
  
    
 










        
    
  
 
A high cost of drug discovery may also seem believable based on
information that is readily available in our memory.  In particular, the
popular press repeatedly reports when late stage drug trials are terminated 
after millions have been spent or when the FDA declines to approve a 
drug.154  These examples are vivid and thus easily recalled in comparison to
the generally unreported fact that only a fraction of drugs cost what the 
cost schema suggests.  In addition, as noted earlier, stories with emotional 
resonance are more likely to be communicated and remembered.  Because 
most people know that researchers have been searching for decades to
find cures for diseases like AIDS or even the common cold, it may seem
logical that drug discovery is exorbitantly expensive.  The contrary story 
that only a minority of drugs are expensive and that it is in fact unclear how
much most drugs cost to develop is a complex story with little emotional
appeal. 
Based on all of the above, perhaps it is logical that even sources presumed 
to be impartial, such as the Congressional Budget Office (Budget Office), 
might be vulnerable to adopting the industry schema.  For example, when
the Budget Office did a study of drug development, it acknowledged that
the cost of drugs could be much less than the frequently touted $800 
million—the number that preceded the current $1 billion estimate.155 
However, it seemed to give support to the higher number when it stated
that it was the “widely circulated estimate” without acknowledging that it is 
circulated by those sympathetic to pharmaceutical companies.156  In  
addition, although the report recognized both that the high number excluded
some drugs with lower costs and that it was based on proprietary data 
that could not be independently verified, the Budget Office still seemed
to endorse the high number by suggesting that it was consistent with other 
reports.157 
More recent policy reports also seem vulnerable to promoting the
industry schema.  For example, the 2013 report of the pharmaceutical 
154. E.g., Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Fails to Approve Diet Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2011, at B1 (noting the FDA has “declined to approve yet another prescription diet pill,” 
making it the third obesity drug in three months that the FDA failed to approve);
Jonathan D. Rockoff & Mia Lamar, Firms Halt Alzheimer’s Drug Work, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 2012, at B7 (noting the companies’ decision to abandon development of a drug
during a phase three trial); Robert Weisman, Biogen Idec’s ALS Drug Falls Short in 
Trials, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2013, at A1 (noting Biogen Idec’s halt of a late-stage clinical trial
after spending more than $80 million). 
155. CBO STUDY, supra note 66, at 2.
 156. Id.
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industry in Australia at one point noted that the submission of Medicines 
Australia, which represents companies that develop and manufacture 
new drugs,158 quoted an average cost of $1.5 billion to bring a new drug 
to market but later simply asserted as fact that “[t]he total cost of 
developing new drugs has been reported as being more than $1 billion,” 
without citation, let alone qualification that this number is disputed.159 
Scholars may be similarly susceptible to adopting the industry schema,
especially when it is considered that patent scholars may have some self-
interest bias in a high number that would better justify the belief that 
patents work well for pharmaceutical innovation.  Indeed, scholars often
repeat the earlier160 and current version of the cost schema.161  There are
some scholars that are cognizant that the number may not be accurate,
but they tend to focus on the fact that it is controversial and generally do
not recognize the most important problem that the number represents a 
minority of drugs.  For example, leading patent scholar Professor Rebecca
Eisenberg noted that the figure is based on self-reported data, such that 
158. About Us, MEDICINES AUSTRALIA, http://medicinesaustralia.com.au/about-us/
(last updated Dec. 2009). 
159. AUSTRALIAN REPORT, supra note 61, at 33, 207. 
160. E.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property
Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
623, 635 (2005) (citing $800 million figure); Carmelo Giaccotto et al., Drug Prices and
Research and Development Investment Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 J.L. 
& ECON. 195, 196 (2005) (citing $802 million figure); Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 85
(echoing the cost schema without questioning its veracity or citing contrary figures); Oskar 
Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene Patents, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177, 235 n.250 (2007) (repeating the figure); Michael J. Malinowski,
Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics Past—Present, and Future?, 36 
CONN. L. REV. 125, 174 n.250 (2003) (repeating the figure).  But see Stuart Minor Benjamin
& Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent Law System Can Learn from
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 308 n.207 (2007) (citing DiMasi 2003, The Price
of Innovation, supra note 129) (noting high cost of innovation but not repeating cost schema);
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1564 n.36 (2006) (citing the DiMasi study,
but using the noncapitalized costs that are not touted by the industry). 
161. E.g., Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 917, 920 n.7; Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on 
Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 728 (2014); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking
Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 926–27 nn.36, 41 (2011); see also Emily Michiko 
Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman 












       
       
   
  
 









   
 
     
 










critics have challenged the estimate.162  Although self-reported data is a 
problem, the much bigger problem, as noted above, is that the figure is 
based on a minority of the most expensive drugs developed.  Professor
Eisenberg does not, however, address this point, nor do other scholars
that have noted that the number is controversial.163 Moreover, some
simply cite the cost schema without contrary numbers or any suggestion
that the number is controversial.164 
Although the most important issue is that scholars often do not seem 
to recognize that the schema represents the small minority of the most 
expensive drugs developed, there is an additional problem. In particular, 
although many scholars may recognize that the study supporting the 
schema may provide an inflated number, they still lend credence to it by
162. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 350, n.15 (2007); see also WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R.
THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41114, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER 
CENTURY LATER 7 (2012) (evidencing the schema in a publication co-authored by an 
academic and a specialist in science and technology policy).
163. E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1616 (noting that the figure is “almost
certainly inflated”); Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How
the TRIPS Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 99, 140 n.167 (2004) (noting that the figure is “not free from doubt,” but not citing
a contrary number or study); David W. Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines, and the 
Innovation Game, 58 VAND. L. REV. 501, 518 n.86 (2005) (acknowledging the number is 
debatable, but nonetheless not providing a contrary number or citations); Michael D.
Rawlins, Cutting the Cost of Drug Development?, 3 NATURE 360, 360 (2004) (stating
“reluctance in view of incomplete disclosure of the data,” but nonetheless accepting the 
figure); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Arjun Jayadev, Medicine for Tomorrow: Some Alternative 
Proposals To Promote Socially Beneficial Research and Development in Pharmaceuticals, 7
J. GENERIC MED. 217, 222 (2010) (noting the disputed estimate but not citing alternative 
estimates or criticisms); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Lecture, Patents, Product Exclusivity, 
and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and 
Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 481 (2003) (citing cost schema and noting it “may
err on the generous side” without citing a lower number). 
164. E.g., SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 162, at 7 (stating that the cost has doubled
and citing the current cost schema without qualification); Cahoy, supra note 160, at 635 
(referring to the “widely cited” estimate from the Tufts Center); Goldman et al., supra
note 6, at 85 (affirmatively stating a current cost of drug development that uses the earlier
version of the cost schema); Morris, supra note 161, at 254 (citing the two cost schema 
figures).  As noted in the earlier section, repeated information is presumed more credible, 
such that scholars are simply following predictions of social scientists in referring to a
commonly repeated number.  This may be particularly true for articles that mention the cost of
drugs in passing to compare the higher expenses of drugs versus other patented products.
See, e.g., Malinowski, supra note 160, at 174 n.250 (mentioning the cost schema only in 
a footnote of an article that is not focused on patents or drugs but rather, eugenics); Seymore,
supra note 161, at 926 n.36 (focusing on the novelty of all inventions in general and only
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simply repeating it.  As discussed earlier, repeated information tends to 
be remembered over time—even if what is repeated is that the information 
is false.165  Accordingly, if leading patent scholars Professors Burk and 
Lemley note that “[t]he pharmaceutical industry reports that it spends as 
much as $800 million on R&D for each new drug produced,” as well as
the fact that the number “is almost certainly inflated,”166 what is likely to
be remembered is that the industry spends $800 million per drug, rather 
than that the number is inflated.  Problematically, this example is typical 
of most scholarly discussions; even those that recognize the number may
not be accurate may nonetheless reinforce it by not only repeating it but
failing to cite any contrary figures.167 
B. Innovation Schema 
This subpart documents the existence of the high innovation schema 
strongly held by pharmaceutical companies and also presumed by some 
scholars. Basically, companies believe that the drugs they produce are
highly innovative, such that they play a critical social role.168  For  
example, one report by the Canadian Intellectual Propery Council, a 
Canadian business coalition whose stated objective is to increase intellectual 
property rights consistent with the position of the pharmaceutical
165. See supra Part II.C.1.
166. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1616; see also Basheer, supra note 6, at 310 
(noting contrary figures and studies, but nonetheless repeating the most current cost schema);
Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 
122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1922 n.62 (2013) (citing earlier figure of approximately $800 million 
and accurately noting that the cost is controversial); Wood, supra note 36, at 618 (noting
that the industry figure has been accused of being “inflated,” but providing no citation
contrary to the situation for the industry figure, which seems to suggest that the industry
schema is in fact valid).
167. See, e.g., supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
168. See, e.g., PHRMA, NEW MEDICINES YIELD SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AGAINST 
SERIOUS DISEASE (2012), available at http://phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/medical_
advances_final_9.4.12.pdf (suggesting that new drugs have been “helping patients live 
longer, healthier lives”); PhRMA Statement on PCAST Innovation Report, PHRMA (Dec.
3, 2012), http://phrma.org/media/releases/phrma-statement-pcast-innovation-report (stating
that PhRMA is responsible for over 300 new medicines in the past decade that “provided 













    














     
  
  
industry,169 stated that “[w]ithout the dedication of the research-based
pharmaceutical companies investing billions in trying to find new 
medicines, our lives would be tremendously different, our life expectancy
would be much shorter and bloodletting and enemas might still be the
favoured techniques to treating almost everything.”170  Although such a 
statement might be mere puffery, it is consistent with the high innovation
schema, as explained below. 
The industry repeatedly emphasizes that it is highly innovative and 
may be particularly inclined to emphasize its role in developing innovative
drugs whenever there are proposals that would impact its profits, such as
possible price regulation of drugs.171 At the same time, consistent with 
studies on confirmation bias, when it comes to studies contradicting this 
schema, the industry either criticizes the underlying research methodology
or ignores them entirely.  This subpart provides evidence of both approaches. 
The industry response to a 2002 report on pharmaceutical innovation
provides an excellent example of confirmation bias.172  The report, 
entitled Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, by the National
Institute for Health Care Management (NIHCM), addressed a number of 
169. See CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. COUNCIL, http://www.ipcouncil.ca/about-us.cfm
(last visited May 20, 2014). 
170. CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. COUNCIL, INNOVATION FOR A BETTER TOMORROW: 
CLOSING CANADA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GAP IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR 5 
(2011) (emphasis added), available at http://www.ipcouncil.ca/uploads/Innovation%20for
%20a%20Better%20Tomorrow.pdf. 
171. For example, in arguing against price regulation, the president of PhRMA 
stated “voters do not want to jeopardize the miracle of life-saving innovation in modern
medicines,” which suggests that PhRMA is responsible for such miracles.  Vicki Kemper, 
Drug Industry Poised To Reap Political Dividends, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2002, at A15
(emphasis added).  In addition, PhRMA tends to minimize the role of many others, including 
government and academics that are responsible for developing roughly half of all new 
drugs. See, e.g., Kneller, supra note 134, at 867, 869–70. 
172. In addition, the industry response is consistent with studies that show that 
providing a defense can reinforce schemas.  PhRMA first stated that the National Institute for
Health Care Management (NIHCM) “arbitrarily” excludes biologics and later accused
NIHCM of arbitrarily excluding large numbers of biologics. Compare PHRMA, NIHCM’S 
REPORT ON PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: FACT VS. FICTION 1 (2002) [hereinafter FACT 
VS. FICTION] (“NIHCM arbitrarily excludes through brief references in the text and a 
footnote all vaccines and other biologic products from its report.”), with PHRMA, 
NIHCM REPORT ON PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: NIHCM RESPONSE TO PHRMA 
REBUTTAL IS SILENT ON THE REAL ISSUES 2–4 (2002) (accusing NICHM of “arbitrarily
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issues, including innovation.173  It concluded that, from 1989–2000, only 
15% of new drugs were highly innovative and the percentage of new 
drugs that were highly innovative was decreasing over time,174 with 
companies mostly developing drugs that were incremental modifications to
existing drugs.175  PhRMA, the lobbying group for major pharmaceutical
companies, strongly criticized not only the report’s conclusions but also 
its methodology as inherently flawed.176  PhRMA’s reaction is consistent
with confirmation bias studies; after all, the report challenged, rather 
than confirmed, the industry’s preferred schema.177 PhRMA’s confirmation 
bias can be seen in its two rebuttals; one to the NIHCM’s original report178 
and another to NIHCM’s defense of its original report.179 
Before considering whether PhRMA’s challenges to the NIHCM’s 
methodology are justified, it is necessary to first understand the
methodology.  Essentially, to evaluate the innovativeness of the drug
industry, NIHCM evaluated most new drugs that entered the domestic 
market from 1989–2000.180  The study excluded vaccines and other
biologic products, which although considered important, were a more 
recent phenomenon such that they were neither consistently present during 
the entire time frame nor considered to be relevant to a retrospective 
study.181  Once such products were excluded, NIHCM assessed drug 
innovativeness using the FDA’s classification system for drug review.182 
That system first classifies a drug as either a NME—having an active
ingredient never previously approved—or as a IMD—a new combination
173. See NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., CHANGING PATTERNS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2002) [hereinafter NIHCM REPORT], available at
http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/innovations.pdf. 
174. Id. at 9. 
175. Id.
 176. FACT VS. FICTION, supra note 172, at 12–13. 
177. See NIHCM REPORT, supra note 173. 
178. FACT VS. FICTION, supra note 172. 
179. NIHCM IS SILENT, supra note 172; see also NIHCM, THE NIHCM 
FOUNDATION RESPONDS TO PHRMA’S CRITICISMS OF THE REPORT, “CHANGING PATTERNS 
OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION” (2002) [hereinafter NIHCM RESPONSE TO PHRMA],
available at http://archives.who.int/prioritymeds/report/append/8343.pdf  (NIHCM’s defense 
of its original report).
180. NIHCM REPORT, supra note 173, at 2.
 181. Id. at 22 n.3. 




    
  
   
  














     
  






of known active ingredients or a new dosage of known drug.183  In addition,
whether a NME or IMD, the FDA categorizes a drug for a standard or
priority review, with priority reviews getting swifter examination because of
stronger patient benefits.184 The priority review is granted for drugs that
are alleged to provide increased effectiveness, reduce side effects, enhance 
patient compliance, or be useful in a new subpopulation of patients.185 
Even a drug that is an IMD can be granted a priority review if it, for
example, shows increased effectiveness compared to prior treatments.186 
Consistent with this framework, the drugs marketed as Celebrex and
Vioxx received priority review status as painkillers based solely on the
fact that they had allegedly improved side effects, even though there was
no claim that they treated pain better than prior drugs.187 
Based on these criteria, NIHCM classified the most innovative drugs 
as those that are not only NMEs, but NMEs granted priority review.188 
The descending order of degree of innovation after NMEs granted 
priority review was: standard NMEs, priority IMDs, and then standard 
IMDs.189  Notably, the report considered drugs in all categories to have
potential value to doctors and patients, but used this framework as a proxy 
for innovation.190 
1. Contesting the Methodology of a Study that Challenges 
This Schema 
PhRMA attacked the methodology underlying the study, consistent 
with confirmation bias studies that consistently show that the methodology
of studies that provide information inconsistent with a preferred schema 
is questioned.191  PhRMA’s challenges focused on two primary issues. 
PhRMA claimed that using the FDA classification system for reviewing 
drug applications was an improper way to evaluate innovation and also
that excluding biologics from the sample was improper.192  As explained
183. Id.
 184. Id. Applications designed for priority review are evaluated in six months, rather
than the ten months for standard reviews.  Thaul, supra note 50, at 3. 
185. NIHCM REPORT, supra note 173, at 6.
186.  Id. 
 187. Id.
 188. Id. at 7. 
189. Id.
 190. Id.
 191. See FACT VS. FICTON, supra note 172. 
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below, each of these issues is not only unfounded but reflects confirmation 
bias. 
PhRMA strongly rejected the use of the FDA classification system as 
a method of assessing innovation, even though a number of other studies,
including some not criticized by PhRMA, have used this metric.193 In 
particular, PhRMA suggested that the FDA classification was simply an 
“FDA management tool,” such that it makes sense that not all drugs can
be granted priority status, even if they offer clinical benefit.194  Although 
it is true that not all drugs can be granted priority status, this statement is
incorrect. It ignores the fact that a drug would be granted priority status 
if it offered any one of an array of possible clinical benefits.  This criticism
likely reflects confirmation bias in not only rejecting the methodology 
that reached a conclusion inconsistent with the innovation schema but 
even misstating the methodology in an attempt to bolster the preferred
schema.
PhRMA also argued that the FDA classification method was irrelevant 
because it does not relate to drug value.195 PhRMA claimed that the FDA’s
own guidelines state that the designation of priority determinations is not
intended to predict a drug’s “ultimate value or its eventual place in the 
market.”196  The change in focus from innovation to value can be explained 
by confirmation bias.  After all, confirmation bias studies would predict 
that unhelpful information is ignored in favor of information that supports a
belief, even if the information is tangential to the original point. 
Furthermore, although PhRMA contested the use of the FDA
classification system, its substantive comments focused almost exclusively
on contesting the priority determination without considering that this is 
only one part of the methodology for assessing innovation. As noted 
earlier, the most innovative drugs were not simply priority drugs, but
priority NMEs.197  Nowhere in the PhRMA attack on methodology does 
193. E.g., Kneller, supra note 134, at 867; Bhaven N. Sampat & Frank R. Lichtenberg,
What Are the Respective Roles of the Public and Private Sectors in Pharmaceutical 
Innovation?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 332, 333–34 (2011). 
194. FACT VS. FICTION, supra note 172, at 3.
 195. See NIHCM IS SILENT, supra note 172, at 5. 
196. FACT VS. FICTION, supra note 172 at 3; see also NIHCM IS SILENT, supra note 
172, at 9–10 (arguing that insurers do not use the FDA system to decide what to cover). 













   
 
  
      




   
     
 
  
     
   
 
 
   
  
it dispute whether NMEs are in fact more innovative than IMDs.198 
Rather, it repeatedly focuses on emphasizing that standard review drugs
can be innovative.199  As noted earlier, standard review drugs are considered
innovative—if they are NMEs.  However, in broadly attacking the NIHCM 
report for giving too much weight to priority drugs, PhRMA fails to
distinguish the critical issue that priority NMEs are not interchangeable 
with priority IMDs.  PhRMA considered all standard review drugs the
same for purposes of criticizing the methodology, when in fact, that is 
not the actual methodology used by the FDA.  This mischaracterization
of the methodology is consistent with confirmation bias in permitting
PhRMA to adhere to its belief that IMDs are  innovative by selectively
ignoring key issues. 
In addition to criticizing the use of the FDA’s classification scheme 
for drug approval, PhRMA attacked the methodology for “arbitrarily” 
excluding biologic drugs and vaccines.200  NIHCM’s report in fact did 
explain that these drugs were recent developments that did not lend
themselves to a retrospective historical analysis to see how innovation 
has changed over time.201  In addition, although PhRMA’s objection seems
to suggest that exclusion of such biologics was essential to the undesirable 
conclusion, subsequent studies suggest otherwise.  In particular, the Budget 
Office found that only one-third of all new drugs, including biologics, were
198. See FACT VS. FICTION, supra note 172. 
199. For example, PhRMA noted as purportedly relevant that the FDA’s annual report
included many drugs as “[n]otable new drug approvals” that were not solely priority reviewed
drugs without addressing whether the standard review drugs were NMEs, which would
be the second most innovative drugs according to the study, yet were not acknowledged 
by PhRMA. See id. at 4. 
200. FACT VS. FICTION, supra note 172, at 1; NIHCM IS SILENT, supra note 172, at 
2. This would seem to suggest that if biologics were included, PhRMA would be considered
innovative. 
201. After PhRMA’s first criticism of its report, NIHCM added an additional
clarification that seventy percent of such drugs were approved within the last six years as
reported by the biotechnology industry and also that the drugs were mostly discovered
not by the pharmaceutical industry but by the biotechnology industry.  NIHCM RESPONSE 
TO PHRMA, supra note 179, at 2.  PhRMA rejected these contentions, claiming that the
number of new biologics approved in the two periods was equal based on FDA statistic, 
but not rejecting the data NIHCM relied on.  See NIHCM IS SILENT, supra note 172, at 3.  
In addition, PhRMA attempted to rebut the assertion that the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries were separate by arguing that they work together and “jointly” develop such
drugs because PhRMA pays for clinical trials and also often provides funding to the 
biotechnology industry. Id.  However, these facts do not establish that PHRMA itself is 
responsible for such innovations; they demonstrate what PhRMA funds, but not what it 
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in fact NMEs, with a growing share of these NMEs as not priority NMEs.202 
PhRMA did not contest this report, consistent with confirmation bias theory
that inconsistent information may be simply ignored. 
PhRMA may also not have contested the Budget Office finding because 
there were other aspects of the report consistent with the innovation schema,
such that there was no need to be critical of the discussion of the limited
number of NMEs and priority NMEs.203  In particular, the Budget Office
report reinforced the industry schema by referring to a focus on NMEs as
“misleading,”204 even while admitting that it is a “[c]onventional” measure
of performance.205  The report instead suggested that the “value” of drugs is
more important, again echoing the rebuttal to the NIHCM report that
reflected confirmation bias in suggesting value was more important.206 
2. Supporting and Reinforcing Schema via Selective Listening 
Since the 2002 NIHCM and 2006 Budget Office reports, those who
hold the innovation schema are likely to continue to hold that schema by
selectively relying on a few recent studies that perpetuate the schema
while simultaneously ignoring studies that contradict the schema. 
202. CBO STUDY, supra note 66, at 7, 12. In fact, the CBO Report recognized that 
the majority of new drugs are simply “modified forms of—or new uses for—existing drugs.” 
Id. at 7. 
203. In fact, in the Introduction, the first major section is titled “The Cost of Developing
a New Drug,” which begins with the subheading “Innovative Drugs,” seeming to suggest
that drugs produced by the industry are in fact innovative.  Id. at 1–2. 
204. Id. at 35. 
205. Id.  This report was criticized for coming “close to reading as if it were written 
by the industry for its lobbying effort,” including its agreement with the industry view of 
innovation.  Donald W. Light, Misleading Congress About Drug Development: Research
and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry—A CBO Study, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 895, 895 (2007).  Interestingly, the formal rebuttal completely ignored the criticism 
of innovation. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Commentary, Misleading Congress about Drug
Development: Reply, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 319 (2008).  This is consistent with
the fact that confirmation bias may lead to ignoring information consistent with a schema.
206. The report also noted that lower NME productivity is not of concern if those 
NMEs are very important, relying on an article authored by someone known to
be sympathetic to the interests of drug companies and who likely holds the innovation
schema. CBO STUDY, supra note 66, at 37 (citing Henry G. Grabowski & Y. Richard 
Wang, The Quantity and Quality of Worldwide New Drug Introductions, 1982–2003, 25 




















   
       
 
 





Those who hold the innovation schema and reject use of NME can rely
on a few articles that support that schema, written by those who likely 
support the schema and display their own confirmation bias.  For example, 
Management Professor Iain Cockburn shows confirmation bias in rejecting
use of NME output207 and instead shifting the focus to “quality” output
to conclude that industry quality output could be rising because new 
products can obtain premium prices in the face of competition from existing 
drugs and generate substantial sales.208  This shift to a focus on supposed 
quality is similar to PhRMA’s earlier claim that drug “value,” rather than 
NME, is relevant.  In both cases, this could easily reflect confirmation
bias in ignoring unfavorable information, such as low levels of NME, in
favor of supposedly helpful information, even if the helpful information 
may not be entirely supported.  As explained later, the pharmaceutical 
market is an imperfect market, such that the claim that drugs are valuable 
because they can command premium prices is not a strong one. 
In addition to objecting to the use of NME to evaluate innovation, 
there may be a tendency to suggest a host of other factors responsible for 
low drug output that similarly reflects confirmation bias in selectively
focusing on information that seems to support the innovation schema. 
For example, an article financially supported by the industry not only
reiterates an objection to the use of NME as a metric but asserts that the 
static number of NME is a function of a focus on riskier targets with low
probability of success.209  Although it is possible that scientific factors
play a role, an emphasis on something other than output is still consistent
with confirmation bias. 
On the other hand, articles that conclude the industry is not innovative
that do not use the disputed NME methodology are ignored, consistent 
with confirmation bias theory that inconsistent information may be
selectively ignored.  For example, a study that concluded that the industry is
207. He does, however, concede that NME is a “popular way to measure innovative
output.” Iain M. Cockburn, Is the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis?, in
7 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 5 (Jaffe et al. eds., 2006). 
208. Id. at 3, 7. 
209. Fabio Pammolli et al., supra note 31, at 428 (arguing that NME counts are an
“imperfect measure” of outcome); see also K.I. Kaitin & J.A. DiMasi, Pharmaceutical 
Innovation in the 21st Century: New Drug Approvals in the First Decade, 2000–2009, 
89 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 183, 184 (2011) (“[D]rug developers 
have been buffeted by a host of formidable threats, including patent expirations for a large
number of top-selling products, growing reimbursement pressures, increasing regulatory
demands, intense market competition, loss of public confidence, and the relentless rise in 
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not that innovative, without using FDA criteria and instead relying on 
patent citation counts, is not rebutted by PhRMA or by any scientists 
associated with the Tufts Center.210  Similarly, studies that have found 
that only about a third of new drugs are therapeutically valuable—consistent 
with the 2002 NICHM report—are also seemingly ignored.211 
Interestingly, although some strongly contest the use of the FDA
classifications, this appears to be the case only if the overall conclusion
is that the industry is not innovative.  One recent article, published by 
authors associated with the same Tufts Center that propagated the cost
schema, claimed that the industry is actually at a high point of innovation
and embraced the use of NME, as well as priority versus standard
classifications, when it was able to selectively use these classifications to
achieve a conclusion consistent with the innovation schema.212 That
article claimed that the percentage of priority products—the ones the 
FDA considers to have some clinical benefit—is at a thirty-year high.213 
However, to achieve this result, the study eliminated most drugs that
would be incremental innovations and thus likely categorized as standard
review drugs.214  This skewed methodology is consistent with confirmation 
210. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Using Patent Data To Assess the Value of
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 176, 176, 182 (2009) (finding that the 
industry is not innovative based on patent citation counts). 
211. E.g., Domenico Motola et al., An Update on the First Decade of the European
Centralized Procedure: How Many Innovative Drugs?, 62 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 
610, 610 (2006) (concluding that only a third of drugs were important therapeutic innovations
based on an algorithm); Johan C.F. van Luijn et al., Superior Efficacy of New Medicines?, 66 
EUR. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 445, 445 (2010) (finding only ten percent of new 
drugs introduced between 1999 and 2005 to be clinically superior over existing medicine);
Agnes I. Vitry et al., Assessment of the Therapeutic Value of New Medicines Marketed in 
Australia, J. PHARMACEUTICAL POL’Y & PRAC. 4–5 (June 13, 2013), http://www.joppp.org/
content/pdf/2052-3211-6-2.pdf (assessing the therapeutic value of medicines in Australia 
and finding similar results as the Motola study).  There are no known published rebuttals
or criticisms to these studies, consistent with confirmation bias theory that suggests inconsistent 
evidence may be completely ignored.
212.  Kaitin & DiMasi, supra note 209, at 184. 
213. Id. at 183. 
214. The study excluded salts, esters, new formulations and new indications. Id. at 184. 
Although some of these could be rated priority drugs, these drugs are generally considered
less innovative.  See infra notes 329–30 and accompanying text (discussing India’s patent law
















   
  
 






       
 
   
    
   
     
  
 
     
    
 
 
bias theory in terms of selective use of NME when it can be manipulated
to support a schema.215 
C. Strong Patent Schema 
The final schema emphasizes that strong patent protection216 of drugs
is essential in promoting pharmaceutical innovation and that all innovation 
is valuable, such that there is no need to consider whether the innovation 
is more incremental or radical.217  In fact, not only is strong protection
embraced but also stronger protection is advocated without recognizing
that this is likely to result in more incremental innovation. In addition,
to the extent that those with this schema sometimes acknowledge 
incremental innovation, supposed benefits are trumpeted while ignoring 
social costs of duplicative innovation.  For example, in a statement to the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a representative of PhRMA stated
that “[s]trong intellectual property protection is essential” to innovation
of the industry, and while broadly claiming credit for “cost-effective 
treatments that continue to increase life expectancy,”218 the statement 
claimed that incremental innovation is not only a normal part of 
pharmaceutical innovation219 but also a method for creating competition
among brand name companies, resulting in increased therapeutic options
215. Another article by an industry scientist also relied on NME, but to arrive at a 
conclusion that industry output is constant, rather than of concern, claiming that any problems
with the disconnect between increasing expenditures and static output is a reflection of
limitations of the existing model of research and development.  Munos, supra note 31, at 959. 
216. Although patents are indeed the primary focus of this schema, it also extends 
to related protections of drugs, such as data exclusivity, which is a different form of protection
provided through regulatory laws, but still considered part of intellectual property protection. 
217. This subpart addresses this schema without addressing the question of whether 
patents are in fact the optimal method of promoting pharmaceutical innovation because it
is clear that patents on drugs will not be eliminated due to international obligations.  However,
for a discussion of other mechanisms, see AIDAN HOLLIS, INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR 
INNOVATION 2 (2007), available at http://ccg.merit.unu.edu/prizefund/resources/Background 
%20reading/Hollis.Aidan.2007_Incentive.Mechanisms.pdf; Amy Kapczynski et al., supra 
note 7, at 1045; see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 27, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 93–94 (1994) (requiring patents on all inventions).
218. Gregory J. Glover, PhRMA, Statement Before the Federal Trade Commission
and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division: Competition in the Pharmaceutical
Marketplace 2 (Mar. 19, 2002); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Thomas Bombelles,
The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection to the American Research-Intensive 
Pharmaceutical Industry, COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Spring 1996, at 38, 43 (“[W]ithout 
adequate and effective patent protection, the research-based pharmaceutical industry would
not exist.”).
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to the benefit of consumers.220  Although this statement may arguably 
reflect self-interest bias of the industry, it does not mean that this is not a 
schema. Moreover, as this subpart will demonstrate, this schema is also
held by academics and policymakers and is sustained through confirmation
bias. For example, a recent article by a group of public policy scholars 
that argues for stronger protection of drugs takes as a given that all new 
drugs are equal in value in calculating an estimate of how much money
is required for development of each drug.221  However, as discussed earlier, 
not all drugs have the same development time, and the assumption that 
the time is equivalent may reflect confirmation bias for the schema that
strong protection is necessary to promote any and all innovation. 
This subpart provides evidence of confirmation bias for the strong 
patent schema in three parts.  The subpart first emphasizes confirmation
bias for strong patents that promote any type of innovation at the domestic 
level.  Then, the subpart provides examples of confirmation bias for the strong
patent schema with respect to claims about international or comparative
levels of innovation. Finally, this subpart concludes with examples of 
confirmation bias in emphasizing supposed benefits of incremental 
innovation that are overstated while ignoring the real social cost of 
duplicative innovation.
1. The Assumption That Strong Patents Are Desirable To 
Promote Any Drugs 
Academics have endorsed the strong patent schema with statements 
supporting the value of strong patents for innovation without consideration
of the type of innovation that is produced.  For example, leading patent
scholars Professors Burk and Lemley affirmatively stated that “[s]trong 
patent rights are necessary” to provide an incentive for companies to 
invest time and money to develop drugs, as if this assertion were so
obvious to justify no supporting citations.222  Although they note in a 
footnote that companies may obtain multiple patents on the same invention,
which suggests lack of innovation, they dismiss this as “a failure of the 
220. Id. at 9. 
221. Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 85. 































     
    
  
system, not its normal function.”223  However, the quick dismissal of what is
an acknowledged industry practice could be consistent with confirmation 
bias.  In particular, consistent with confirmation bias theory that inconsistent
information is ignored, the phenomenon of incremental patenting could
be labeled as not relevant because that is not the goal of the patent system,
even though the result is equally important as the goal.
Two articles by Professor Benjamin Roin provide another example of
how the argument for strong patent rights is often made without considering
what type of innovation will be promoted.  In 2009, he argued that existing
patent standards “suppress” innovation and thus more protection was 
necessary to promote innovation.224  In making this argument, he seemed to 
assume that all new drugs are valuable.225  Although Roin at one point
acknowledged that some drugs offer “little or no therapeutic advantage 
over existing drugs,” he quickly dismissed that by claiming that new drugs 
on the whole yield substantial net benefits.226  More recently, in an article
focusing on tailoring patent terms to the time necessary to develop a 
marketable invention, he suggests that certain types of drugs, such as
early stage and preventative treatments for cancer and Alzheimer’s are not 
developed because the patent term is inadequate.227 Although Roin’s
candidly admits in his recent article that it is unclear whether more protection
would promote more drug development, he says that “it is very likely
that it would have this effect.”228  This assumption, without strong evidence
seems consistent with confirmation bias in that evidence is not scrutinized
when it is consistent with an existing schema.
223. Id. at 1617 n.135. 
224. 
225.  Id. at 508.  
Roin, supra note 6, at 557. 
226. Id. at 514–15. 
227. Roin, supra note 161, at 678, 752. 
228.  Roin, supra note 161, at 752.  Interestingly, an earlier draft posted on the Social  
Science Research Network (SSRN) seems to suggest greater support for the strong patent 
schema than the published article.  In particular, the draft specifically stated that the difference
in the cost of developing versus copying a drug supported the conclusion that “strong ”
protection is essential for drug development, citing the author’s own prior work. Benjamin
Roin, The Case For Tailoring Patent Awards Based on the Time-to-Market Inventions (Nov. 
4, 2013) (draft manuscript at 28, nn.138), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2235354.  This statement may reflect confirmation bias in suggesting that the
alternative is “weak (or no) protection,” suggesting that weak and zero protections
are equivalent. Id.  In the published article, Roin instead states that “[m]ore so than in any
other industry, the revenues that pharmaceutical companies earn from their patents appear to
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Another example of confirmation bias for the strong patent schema is 
a focus on a false choice.  For example, Professors Burk and Lemley argued 
that pharmaceuticals deserve stronger protection and based this on the 
assumption that “innovation would drop substantially in the pharmaceutical
industry in the absence of effective patent protection,”229 citing a study 
that examined the difference between patent protection and no patent 
protection at all.230  Their general argument for stronger protection reflects
the strong patent schema, and the reliance on a study that compares 
patent protection versus none at all may reflect confirmation bias in that 
the focus of the discussion is shifted to a nonissue that better supports 
the strong patent schema.231  By emphasizing the dramatic impact of no 
patent protection—even if wholly irrelevant—the strong patent schema 
may seem to be a logical choice.  Indeed, the fact that there is an economics 
study that exists to calculate the economic cost to society of patent 
protection versus no patent protection when this is not a legal or political 
reality reflects confirmation bias for the strong patent schema.  After all, 
there is no empirical need for such a study when no one is suggesting— 
or could legally suggest—eliminating patents on drugs, and most suggestions
are only to strengthen protection.
Similar to academics, policymakers may hold the strong patent schema,
or at least be susceptible of reinforcing the schema.  This may in part be
due to the fact that the industry frequently presents its positions to those 
that create policy reports.  For example, in a 2003 report by the FTC, the 
summary section on innovation noted that “strong patent protection is
essential to innovation,” without qualifying that the innovation is 
incremental, even though the section documents that most FDA-approved 
drugs are incremental innovations.232  In addition, although the report
229. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1617 (emphasis added); see also Daniel J. Gervais, 
The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the Very Old and
the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 940 n.63 (2002) 
(“[W]ithout strong patent protection, there would be no research-based pharmaceutical 
industry—and few new drugs would be developed . . . .”).
230. James W. Hughes et al., “Napsterizing” Pharmaceuticals: Access, Innovation, 
and Consumer Welfare  3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9229, 2002).
231. There are other possible explanations.  For example, it may be that there are 
inadequate studies comparing strong versus moderate patent protection or that such studies 
are hard to create.




















     
  
 
   
     
    
   
 
         
      
  




aims to present two sides to the benefits or detriments of incremental
drugs, it seems to ultimately side with the strong patent schema in stating as
fact that a modification of patent laws that permitted generic drugs to
more easily achieve regulatory approval “forced brand-name firms to
come up with new products to replenish their revenue streams,” citing 
PhRMA’s testimony to the FTC.233  Although a few pages earlier in the
report, the FTC acknowledged that some generic companies were skeptical
of innovation, the report seems to suggest that it is reasonable for companies
to focus on incremental innovation.234 
Confirmation bias supporting the strong patent schema is also 
reflected in selective reliance and consideration of economics literature. 
Academics who hold this schema often cite a few economics articles to 
support the claim that strong, or stronger patents are necessary for
pharmaceutical innovation.235  One frequently cited study by Edwin 
Mansfield finds that the pharmaceutical industry is one of the rare fields 
where the industry relies on patents and suggests that without any patents,
there would be less pharmaceutical innovation.236  However, this study is
simply about whether firms value patents and does not attempt to consider 
whether more protection would result in more innovation or what type of
innovation, let alone whether there might be social costs to doing so.  Other
economists have found that stronger patent protection does in fact result 
233. Id. at 11 (citing Glover, supra note 218, at 7). 
234. Id. at 8, 11. 
235. E.g., Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role 
of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 667, 673 
(2002) (citing Edwin Mansfield, supra note 29, at 180) (noting that it has been historically
accepted that a stronger patent right will result in more innovation and that although this
is not generally true, the study by Edwin Mansfield suggests that it may be true for 
pharmaceuticals); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 555 n.57 (2011) (citing Mansfield, supra note 29, at 174); Arti
K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289 n.1 (2003) (citing Cohen et al., supra note 29, at 2); see 
also F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 699 n.4 (2001) (citing Mansfield, supra note 29, for the proposition that
there is a link between patents and innovation). 
236. Mansfield, supra note 29, at 175 Table 1. In addition, there are studies that note
that patent protection is correlated with more research spending in the pharmaceutical industry,
although not necessarily for other areas. E.g., Kendall W. Artz et al., A Longitudinal Study of
the Impact of R&D, Patents, and Product Innovation on Firm Performance, 27 J. PRODUCT 
INNOVATION MGMT. 725, 725–26 (2010).  However, more spending does not necessarily
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in more patenting, but not necessarily an increase in innovation.237  In  
addition, some note that above a certain level of patent protection, 
innovation may in fact be reduced.238  These economic studies with 
important caveats are selectively but predictably ignored by those who
hold the strong patent schema because they are not helpful to maintaining 
that schema.
Consistent with confirmation bias, those who adhere to the strong
patent schema may selectively ignore statements in the economics
literature that are inconsistent with the schema.  For example, although 
scholars cite an article by Richard Levin et al., entitled Appropriating the
Returns from Industrial Research and Development, for the argument that
patents are necessary for pharmaceuticals,239 most fail to note that this
article does not endorse strong patents without limits.240  In one key 
passage, the article states that 
“it should not be taken for granted that . . . better protection necessarily leads to 
more innovation . . . . Better protection may yield more innovation at the cost of
incrementally increasing resources devoted to producing the innovation: the larger
prize may merely encourage duplicative private effort to capture it.”241 
Indeed, this appears to reflect what happens in the pharmaceutical industry 
where multiple firms compete to address the same problem, resulting in
duplicative research.242  Similarly, another economics article that explicitly
takes on what it describes as “[t]oday’s conventional wisdom . . . that strong
and broad patent rights are conducive to economic progress” is also not
237. E.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, Patents and Patent Policy, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y
568, 574 (2007). 
238. E.g., Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a
Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-Country Analysis of Pharmaceutical Patent
Protection, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 436, 436 (2007). 
239. Levin et al., supra note 29. 
240. E.g., Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 
IOWA L. REV. 735, 831 n.259 (2000); A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of 
Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 305 n.244 (1996); Arti K.
Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 
103 COLUM L. REV. 1035, 1073 n.167 (2003); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 235, at 289 
n.1. 
241. Levin et al., supra note 29, at 787 (emphasis added). 





    
   
 
 
   
  
 
   





     
  
 
       
 
     
 
 





   
  
   
cited by those who favor strong patent rights for pharmaceuticals.243  The
article states that “[i]n view of the fact that patents entail social and economic
costs, it would seem wise not to push for stronger patent protection, unless 
the evidence indicated that the economic benefits were significant.”244 
Although this article is admittedly not focused on pharmaceuticals, its 
more balanced consideration of the costs of patent protection, which are 
generally ignored in discussions of strengthening patent protection for 
drugs, is still consistent with confirmation bias.245 
2. Supporting the Schema Through Selective Consideration of 
International Evidence 
Those who adhere to the strong patent schema argue that stronger patent 
protection resulted in more domestic innovation in certain countries; 
however, the evidence is in fact more ambiguous.246  An article by 
economist Henry Grabowski provides a good example.  He claims that 
in both Japan and Canada, stronger patent protection resulted in more 
pharmaceutical research.247  However, there are studies that provide a 
243. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong
Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 273 (1998). 
244. Id. at 274. 
245. See id. at 279–81.  Of course, I could be influenced by my own confirmation bias
in citing this article, which focuses more on the problem that increased patents have on
cumulative innovation, which is largely inapplicable to pharmaceuticals.  Nonetheless, as 
discussed in the next subpart, even if cumulative innovation does not apply to pharmaceuticals,
there are other negative social implications that are generally minimized or discounted
entirely by those who hold the strong patent schema. 
246. This discussion focuses primarily on countries that were at a level of economic
development where patents might potentially impact innovation.  However, there is also
confirmation bias by those who fail to acknowledge studies showing that patent protection is
irrelevant for countries that are not at a state of development to innovate. See, e.g., Frederick
M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection
of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 325 (2005) (“Stronger patent protection in
developing countries will increase total research and development.”).  Studies actually show 
that stronger patents do not induce more domestic innovation—they may simply result in
increased patents by foreigners. Josh Lerner, Patent Protection and Innovation Over 150
Years 19–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8977, 2002); see also
Shamnad Basheer & Annalisa Primi, The WIPO Development Agenda: Factoring in the
“Technologically Proficient” Developing Countries, in  IMPLEMENTING WIPO’S 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 100–01 (Jeremy De Beer ed., 2009) (noting that patent protection
is ineffective in promoting innovation unless a country is at a certain level of economic
development). 
247. Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5
J. INT’L ECON. L. 849, 854–55 (2002). In both cases, full patent protection for drugs was 
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contrary conclusion.248  Moreover, although Canada did increase research
after changes in its patent laws in 1987, the industry actually promised to
spend more on pharmaceutical development in Canada.249 
Similarly, Brian Ferguson, a professor of economics, contests the 
work of economists Michelle Boldrin and David Levine that suggests 
that many countries that did not provide patents on pharmaceuticals 
nonetheless had pharmaceutical activity.250  Ferguson exhibits confirmation
bias in contesting their methodology, claiming that Boldrin and Levine 
fail to address that the pharmaceutical industry advanced from one of 
secrecy to protect intellectual property into one where reverse engineering 
was possible, such that patents were needed.251  However, Ferguson’s
critique does not reconcile with the historical fact that not all countries 
adopted patent protection of drugs at the same time; scientific advancement
is insufficient to explain why countries like Italy did not adopt patents on 
drugs until 1978 while other countries did so earlier.252 
Admittedly, stronger domestic patent protection may not have much 
of an impact on an individual country’s overall research given that most
companies today are multinational.253  Nonetheless, even if that is the
case, the above discussion still shows confirmation bias in that this issue 
248. E.g., Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, 7 
J. INT’L. ECON. L. 359, 361–63 (2004); Mariko Sakakibara & Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger
Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 
RAND J. ECON. 77, 78, 88, 98 (2001). 
249. Although Grabowski acknowledges in a footnote that the industry promised to
locate research in Canada proportional to Canada’s share of world sales, there is no cite 
for this fact.  Instead, he cites articles about the different issue of Canadian price regulation 
that appeared after stronger patent protection was introduced.  See Grabowski, supra
note 247, at 855 n.18 (citing PATRICIA M. DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION:
NATIONAL POLICIES VERSUS GLOBAL INTERESTS (1997); Sheila R. Shulman, The Canadian 
Patented Medicine Review Board: New Rules and New Status, PHARMACOECONOMICS, Nov. 
1994, at 71). 
250. See Brian Ferguson, The Role of Patents in the Pharmaceutical Sector: A
Primer, in PILLS PATENTS & PROFITS II 12 (2012). 
251. Id.
 252. MICHELLE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
244–45 (2008).
253. This point is well made by Lisa Ouellette, who argues that studies of a single 
country’s patent laws will understate the impact of the change.  Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7–16) (on



















   
    
    
  
    
 
 
   





is ignored and there is selective citation of studies or statements without 
any relevant cites.  In addition, consistent with the studies on confirmation 
bias, when there is ambiguity—in this case, studies with differing
conclusions—scholars may find it easier to cite articles that support their 
desired position.254 
The pharmaceutical industry can be expected to be even less vigorous 
in making such claims and being prone to confirmation bias.  For
example, although studies indicate that Italy did not increase its level of 
innovation after patent laws were strengthened,255 PhRMA claimed that
it had a four-fold increase in R&D.256  Not surprisingly, PhRMA did not
cite the contrary studies and only relied on its own industry profile.257 
Similarly, the United States Trade Representatives Office, which often 
echoes the interests of the industry, also seems to display confirmation
bias in how it considers comparative data; it has claimed that Jordan’s
domestic research was stimulated after entering into a free trade agreement
with the United States that required stronger patent protection.258  However, 
although Jordan had improved economic growth, there was no increase
in pharmaceutical investment or patent filings by local manufacturers.259 
3. Supporting the Schema Through Selective Reliance on Supposed 
Value of Incremental Innovation 
The last important aspect of the strong patent schema is an emphasis
on the fact that there are no net negative social implications to stronger 
patents.  To those that subscribe to the strong patent schema, confirmation 
bias may result in overly defending incremental innovation without
254. See supra Part II.B.2.
 255. E.g., Pablo M. Challu, Effects of the Monopolistic Patenting of Medicine in 
Italy Since 1978, 10 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 237, 245–46 (1995); F.M. Scherer & Sandy
Weisburst, Economic Effects of Strengthening Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Italy, 
26 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1009, 1024 (1995). 
256. PHRMA, DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE, supra note 62, at 10 (2002) (citing 
PHRMA, 2001 INDUSTRY PROFILE 105); see also Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protection 
and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 95, 105 (1996–1997) 
(claiming that predictions of disastrous results for countries that adopted stronger patent
protection were incorrect, without any citations).
257. PhRMA, supra note 62, at 10 (citing PHRMA, 2001 INDUSTRY PROFILE 105).
258. Marilyn Chase & Sarah Lueck, In New Trade Pacts, U.S. Seeks To Limit
Reach of Generic Drugs, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2004, at A1.
259. See Hamed El-Said & Mohammed El-Said, TRIPS-Plus Implications for
Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: Lessons from Jordan-United States Free
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acknowledging social costs.260  Social costs include the cost of duplicative
research, as well as the cost of higher priced products of minimal
therapeutic value.261  These costs are not necessarily unique to drugs, but 
overlooking these costs while simultaneously emphasizing benefits 
when innovation is more modest is consistent with confirmation bias.262 
There are a number of defenses of incremental innovation that show 
confirmation bias in attempting to focus on dubious benefits of such
innovation while simultaneously ignoring clear social costs.  The first 
one is that what seems incremental is actually simultaneous development; 
this fundamentally highlights duplicative research without acknowledging 
that such duplication is an undesirable social cost.263 Second, incremental 
innovation is defended as typical of all industries and also not a problem 
because it is permissible under the patent system.264  However, even if 
legal and typical, raising these facts reflects confirmation bias in selectively 
ignoring the social costs of providing patent protection on less important
innovation.  Third, incremental innovation is defended by those that 
subscribe to the strong patent schema by citing some supposed social 
benefits that upon closer inspection are debatable.265 
One example of a defense of incremental innovation that fails to 
acknowledge social costs of duplicative research is an article by economists
DiMasi and Paquette, who are associated with the same Tufts Center that 
propagated the cost schema.266  The fundamental thesis of this article is
that what appears to be “follow-on” innovation267 is in fact simultaneously
260. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1616–17; Hemphill, supra note 30, 
at 1563–64.  Critics sometimes refer to incremental innovation as me too or follow on drugs. 
See Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-on Drug Research 
and Development, PHARMACOECONOMICS, Oct. 2004, at 1, 2.  Not surprisingly, the industry
disputes the me too term as unduly critical and inaccurate.  Id.
 261. See Michael A. Sartori, An Economic Incentives Analysis of the Jury’s Role in 
Patent Litigation, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 331, 337–38, 346 (1997). 
262. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
 263. See Sartori, supra note 261, at 346–47. 
264. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1619–20. 
265. See Roin, supra note 6, at 513–14. 
266.  DiMasi & Paquette, supra note 260. 
267. The term follow-on is used in contrast to a drug that is the first in a class.  Id.
at 2. For example, the drug sold as Prozac was the first in a class of antidepressants
commonly referred to as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) that all operate in
the same way, albeit with different chemical compounds, and the drug Zoloft was a follow-on 
SSRI. Id. at 6. Some critics refer to these as me too drugs. 
475 
 










    
  





    
      
      
   
  
    
    
  
   
 
 
     
developed, such that the label follow-on is misleading.268 However, the
data they use to support this conclusion is limited to NMEs and excludes 
other incremental innovation, such as reformulations—slight modifications— 
of existing compounds, or sequential patents on multiple aspects of a 
drug.269  The focus on solely NMEs may reflect confirmation bias in 
focusing on a narrow part of incremental innovation that may be more 
easily defended.  In addition, although other economists have recognized 
that there are social costs to strong patent rights that result in duplicative 
research, this article seems to applaud such duplicative research simply 
because the duplication occurred simultaneously.270  However, even if 
firms did not copy each other in developing similar research, that does
not negate the fact that there is still duplicative research, which is a social
cost. 
A common refrain by those that support incremental innovation and
strong patent protection is that this is typical innovation, such that it 
should be supported just as much as breakthrough innovation so long as 
the invention is patentable. Incremental innovation is defended by the 
industry,271 as well as by some scholars,272 and policymakers.273 Those 
268. See id. at 2; see also Joseph A. DiMasi & Laura B. Faden, Competitiveness in 
Follow-on Drug R&D: A Race or Imitation?, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 23, 25– 
26 (2011) (“[N]ew drug development is better characterized as a race to market among 
drugs in a new theraputic class, rather than a lower risk imitation of a proven breakthrough.”).
In addition, even if this is true in part, there are still follow-on drugs approved long after the 
initial drug that do not fit this phenomenon. E.g., Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry, 
Commentary, How Many “Me-Too” Drugs Is Too Many?, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 711, 711
(2011).
269. For example, patents can be obtained on not only the main active ingredient 
but methods of manufacture, intermediates, and packaging.  See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 39–42, 410 (2d ed. 2010); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Think
Globally, Prescribe Locally: How Rational Pharmaceutical Policy in the U.S. Can Improve 
Global Access to Essential Medicines, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 125, 136 (2008) (noting patents
on peripheral aspects of drugs can lead to “extensions in market exclusivity”).  Other terms
include stockpiling, lawyering, or line extensions. See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40917, PATENT “EVERGREENING”: ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION 1 (2009) [hereinafter THOMAS, PATENT EVERGREENING].
270. This study could be alternatively explained as responding to the term me too
that is often used by critics of follow-on innovation that seems to suggest copying.  However,
confirmation bias still seems to be a sound explanation for justifying an academic paper
to prove simultaneous development. 
271. E.g., GlaxoSmithKline Government Affairs, Public Policy and Patient Advocacy, 
Global Public Policy Issues: Evergreening, GLAXOSMITHKLINE (Aug. 2011), http://www.
gsk.com/content/dam/gsk/globals/documents/pdf/GSK-and-evergreening.pdf; see also Scott 
Parker & Kevin Mooney, Is “Evergreening” a Cause for Concern? A Legal Perspective, 13 
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who hold the strong patent schema that endorses incremental innovation 
equally with breakthrough innovation emphasize that the patent standards
are neutral,274 but selectively ignores evidence that many patents on
incremental innovation have actually been later found invalid275 and the
fact that the patent system as a whole is criticized as too lenient in
granting patents.276 
Confirmation bias is also seen in that supporters of the strong patent 
schema raise incomplete rebuttals to criticisms that the industry develops 
and promotes mostly incremental drugs whose expense is less justified 
than more innovative drugs.277  For example, they suggest that the patent 
system adequately recognizes different types of innovation with a 
narrower scope of rights for incremental innovations, such that patents 
The Degree to Which Patenting, and in Particular Secondary Patenting, Protect Pharmaceutical 
Products During Their Lifecycle Is Often Misconstrued, EUR. FED’N PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRIES & ASS’N (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.efpia.eu/blog/ 9/71/The-degree-to-which-
patenting-and-in-particular-secondary-patenting-protect-pharmaceutical-products-during-their  
-lifecycle-is-ofsten-miscontrued [hereinafter EEPIA Study] (noting that “’incremental innovation’  
is in no way lesser innovation either legally or scientifically”).
272. E.g., DiMasi & Paquette, supra note 260, at 12; Albert Wertheimer et al., Too 
Many Drugs? The Clinical and Economic Value of Incremental Innovations, in INVESTING IN 
HEALTH: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HEALTH CARE INNOVATION 79 (Irina 
Farquhar et al. eds., 2001) (claiming that most technology is incremental, rather than
breakthrough). 
273. E.g., CBO STUDY, supra note 66, at 16; THOMAS, PATENT EVERGREENING, 
supra note 269, at 8 (citing Ivar M. Kaardal, The American Invetnros Protection Act, the 
Independent Inventor’s Interest & Consumer Choice in the Market, 84 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 503 (2002)) (claiming that “patent law experts” consider incremental 
innovation to be typical and potentially beneficial, although what is cited is not specific 
to the pharmaceutical industry). Notably, although the CBO Report largely defended
incremental innovations, some aspects of the report nonetheless recognized that the cost 
of such innovation might not be justified. See CBO STUDY, supra note 66, at 2 (noting
higher prices for reformulations “may not be commensurate with the additional value that
those drugs provide”). 
274. E.g., THOMAS, PATENT EVERGREENING, supra note 269, at 8.
 275. E.g., EUROPEAN GENERIC MEDS. ASS’N, PATENT-RELATED BARRIERS TO MARKET 
ENTRY FOR GENERIC MEDICINES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 13 (Kristof Roox ed., 2008), 
available at http://www.egagenerics.com/images/publication/PDF/IP_Barriers_web.pdf. 
276. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 47–51; Carlos María Correa, 
Ownership of Knowledge—The Role of Patents in Pharmaceutical R&D, 82 BULL. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 784, 784–85 (2004). 
277. See PCAST REPORT, supra note 14, at 73; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim, supra 
























     







on incremental innovations do not block competition from patents that 
have expired by selectively ignoring key information.278  Technically, a
patent that has expired cannot block others from making what is patented;
however, a key piece of missing information that is selectively left out of 
this defense is that companies generally have multiple patents that cover 
a drug and also obtain these sequentially, such that the expiration of one
patent on a drug will not necessarily result in generic competition because it
is still protected by other unexpired patents.279  Indeed, at times, the
industry not only acknowledges this practice but, in fact, defends it as 
legitimate “lifecycle management” of a drug to continue to sustain profits.280 
Finally, rather than address the negative repercussions of duplicative 
research, defenders of incremental innovation focus on alleged social
benefits.281  Defenders claim that such innovation is valuable because of
some data that shows some incremental innovations to be valuable,
providing selective evidence of therapeutic benefits of incremental
innovation and suggesting that such innovation is responsible for overall 
reductions in medical expenditures.282  In addition, defenders claim that
innovation is valuable if consumers purchase it.283 Defenders also note
that incremental innovation is valuable in providing increased competition 
that lowers costs.284  However, each of these defenses is problematic, as 
explained below. 
Although adherents of the strong patent schema may suggest that 
independent evidence from the World Health Organization (WHO) supports 
the value of incremental innovation, a closer look at this evidence still 
shows confirmation bias. Those that endorse this schema have noted
that half of the drugs on WHO’s list of essential drugs were actually 
278. E.g., GlaxoSmithKline Government Affairs, Public Policy and Patient Advocacy, 
supra note 271 (alleging that the medical community and paying authorities decide whether 
the patent premium for the newer version is justified).
279. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An
Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0049470. 
280. EFPIA Study, supra note 271.  Indeed, there are books dedicated to this approach. 
E.g., TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN, PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT: MAKING
THE MOST OF EACH AND EVERY BRAND (2012); MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: 
UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA AND PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT (3d 
ed. 2011). 
281. E.g., Ernst Berndt et al., The Impact of Incremental Innovation in 
Biopharmaceuticals, PHARMACOECONOMICS, Dec. 2006, at 69, 71. 
282. See id.
 283. See id.
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incremental, rather than the first in the class,285 relying on an academic 
article authored by scientists affiliated with the Tufts Center responsible 
for the cost schema discussed above.286  However, this claim selectively 
ignores the fact that this study does not include the most problematic 
type of incremental innovations—reformulations, which are very minor 
changes to existing compounds—and instead focuses solely on NMEs 
that are follow-on inventions.
Defenders of incremental innovation also attempt to establish the 
value of such innovation by citing specific examples that provide
therapeutic benefit.287  However, there may still be confirmation bias in
failing to provide any data on the percent of incremental innovations that 
provided therapeutic benefit.  Without such data, the articles supporting
incremental innovation can selectively choose examples that support the
claim of therapeutic benefit—even if there are many more contrary
examples.  Such an approach is, of course, consistent with confirmation
bias. 
The claim that the cost of incremental drugs is worthwhile based on 
overall reductions in medical expenditures due to the utility of such 
drugs is also questionable.  The economist Frank Lichtenberg has indeed 
authored a number of papers that make this claim,288 and his papers have
been cited to support the claim that newer drugs result in increased
longevity and reductions in medical expenditures—to the extent that 
drugs might substitute more expensive treatment such as surgery.289 
285. E.g., id. at 82; ALBERT I. WERTHEIMER & THOMAS M. SANTELLA, 
PHARMACEUTICAL EVOLUTION: THE ADVANTAGES OF INCREMENTAL INNOVATION IN 
DRUG DEVELOPMENT 9 (2009), available at http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wertheimer% 
20and%20Santella%20-%20Pharmaceutical%20Evolution.pdf; Harvey E. Bale & Boris Azais,
Pharmaceutical Innovation Is Evolutionary and Incentive-Driven, 82 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 788, 788 (2004); Joshua Cohen & Kenneth Kaitin, Follow-on Drugs and Indications: 
The Importance of Incremental Innovation to Medical Practice, 15 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 
89, 89–90 (2008). 
286. J. Cohen et al., Role of Follow-on Drugs and Indications on the WHO Essential 
Drug List, 31 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 585 (2006).
287. E.g., Wertheimer et al., supra note 272, at 86–98. 
288. E.g., Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth Their
Cost? Evidence From the 1996 MEPS, 20 HEALTH AFF. 241 (2001); Frank R. Lichtenberg,
The Impact of New Drug Launches on Longevity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9754, 2003). 


















   
 
 
   
   
  
   
   
     






However, his studies do not support the claim that this is due exclusively 
to incremental innovation because he considers both brand new and
incremental drugs together.  Moreover, others have contested his claims290 
or failed to replicate his conclusion.291  In fact, a recent study that focused 
solely on incremental innovation found that in the long term, incremental
innovations may cost consumers more money by impeding low cost, 
generic alternatives.292  This has obvious consequences because even if a
newer patented version might have some therapeutic value, that value 
may be theoretical for patients who cannot afford the expense.293 
In addition, the claim by defenders of the strong patent schema that 
the marketplace is the proper place to assess the value of a drug also
selectively ignores information—consistent with cognitive bias— 
concerning the fact that the pharmaceutical market operates in a unique 
manner.294  For example, a doctor may give a patient a “free” sample of 
a new, patented version and also prescribe that new version without the 
patient ever realizing that there is a less expensive and equally effective
generic drug available.295 Alternatively, a patient may demand a newer,
patented version that is not a therapeutic improvement based on advertising.  
Accordingly, the marketplace is not necessarily deciding whether the 
higher costs associated with a marginally different improvement are
290. E.g., Paul Grootendorst et al., Life-Expectancy Gains from Pharmaceutical
Drugs: A Critical Appraisal of the Literature, 9 EXPERT REV. PHARMACOECONOMICS 
OUTCOMES RES. 353 passim (2009).
291. Yuting Zhang & Stephen B. Soumerai, Do Newer Prescription Drugs Pay For 
Themselves? A Reassessment Of The Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF. 880, 880 (2007). 
292. Stephane Régnier, What Is the Value of “Me-too” Drugs?, 16 HEALTH CARE 
MGMT. SCI. 300, 300 (2013). 
293. E.g., Kesselhiem, supra note 7, at 1855; Economic Problems Facing Families, 
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 3–4 (April 2008), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.
files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7773.pdf. 
294. E.g., GlaxoSmithKline Government Affairs, Public Policy and Patient Advocacy, 
supra note 271. 
295. Studies show that samples provided to doctors influence their prescribing choices
and also that companies usually only provide samples of the most expensive drugs. E.g., 
Richard F. Adair & Leah R. Holmgren, Do Drug Samples Influence Resident Prescribing
Behavior? A Randomized Trial, 118 AM. J. MED. 881 (2005); Lisa D. Chew et al., A 
Physician Survey of the Effect of Drug Sample Availability on Physicians’ Behavior, 15 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 478 (2000); K.E.M. Groves et al., Prescription Drug Samples –
Does this Marketing Strategy Counteract Policies for Quality Use of Medicines?, 28 J. 
CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 259 (2003); Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram 
Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors, PLOS
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“worthwhile expenditures”296 or that they necessarily reflect the superiority 
of a drug.297 
The suggestion that all incremental innovation is socially valuable 
because incremental innovation results in increased competition and 
lower costs is also problematic.298  Competition among patented drugs may 
modestly reduce costs for consumers, but the price reduction is negligible 
compared to the more dramatic cost differential between patented and 
generic drugs. Even those that assert that multiple entrants reduce price 
do not necessarily cite strong price competition—one study asserted that 
thirteen of twenty drugs were priced at discounts of “at least 5%.”299  In
contrast, the differential between a patented drug and a generic drug is
dramatic; when there are multiple entrants, the price drop may be far more 
than fifty percent.300 
In conclusion, although there may be some value to incremental 
innovation in drug development, the problem is that such innovation is 
overly defended by those who hold the strong patent schema.  This has 
serious consequences because those who hold this schema often argue 
for more protection of drugs, which would likely further exacerbate the
current situation of producing mostly incremental drugs that have social 
costs that are often given undue consideration.
296. THOMAS, PATENT EVERGREENING, supra note 269, at 9. 
297. In recent years, this problem may be somewhat lessened by the fact that insurers
are becoming more resistant to covering all new medication. However, what is covered is 
subject to complex negotiations that still reflect an imperfect market.
298. There is a related claim that incremental innovation reduces costs because if
no such innovation were permitted, drugs would be more expensive.  E.g., COMM’N ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROP., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREMENTAL 
INNOVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (2005). However, this reflects confirmation bias as a 
false choice because no one is suggesting barring all such innovation but simply questioning
whether more such innovation is on balance socially desirable.  Moreover, drug prices do 
not seem to be correlated with the cost of development, as reflected by the fact that marketed
drugs may have sudden and substantial price increases. E.g., John Carreyrou, Inside Abbott’s 
Tactics to Protect AIDS Drug, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB11677 
8411362865429 (last updated Jan. 3, 2007, 12:00 AM) (reporting a 400% price increase); 
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-10-201, BRAND-NAME PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG PRICING: LACK OF THERAPEUTICALLY EQUIVALENT DRUGS AND LIMITED COMPETITION 
MAY CONTRIBUTE TO EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASE (2009) (discussing a Congressionally
mandated study to investigate sudden price increases). 
299.  Wertheimer et al., supra note 272, at 108–09. 



















IV. ADDRESSING THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
INOVATION SCHEMAS
This Part explores the implications of the schemas unveiled in Part III.
Subpart A discusses how to address current schemas and the fact that 
repetition has unfortunately made them seem true.  Subpart B argues that 
patent and related laws should be modified to better promote important 
drug innovation, including specific suggestions of how to do so.  Subpart 
C suggests additional related schemas for future exploration. 
A. Addressing Existing Schemas 
This subpart suggests a three-step approach to addressing the existing
schemas. The most fundamental first step is simply acknowledging that 
previously recognized beliefs are in fact schemas. Hopefully, Part III 
was effective in establishing this.  However, even if it was, studies show 
that schemas are difficult to change. Accordingly, there is a need for
additional work beyond a single article to address long-held schemas by 
academics, policymakers, and the general public.  To that end, the next
step is for scholars and policymakers that recognize the schemas to take 
steps to avoid unintentionally perpetuating them.  This may seem modest,
but it is nonetheless a critical step because anytime a schema is perpetuated,
it is reinforced as true.  The final step is for scholars and policymakers to 
directly challenge the schemas through further studies and broadly
disseminate these to not only other scholars but also the popular press.
1. Avoiding Unintentionally Propagating Problematic Schemas 
It is simple to say that problematic schemas should not be propagated 
but much more difficult to implement.  Typical writing techniques for 
journalists and law professors usually suggest focusing on extremes. 
Indeed, in writing this Article, this Author struggled with how to explain 
the schemas without reinforcing them. This Author attempted to give 
schemas neutral abbreviations and also attempted to avoid repeating
schemas in explanatory footnotes.  However, it is unclear whether these
efforts were successful.  Moreover, even if successful in this Article, these
approaches are not broadly applicable.  Accordingly, this subpart will
attempt to outline more broadly applicable suggestions. 
There are specific things that scholars can do to avoid propagating the
cost schema.  For example, in articles that simply want to reference the 
cost of drug discovery, scholars can more ambiguously note that the cost 
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schema without repeating it.301  Moreover, scholars can and should cite 
contrary studies and numbers to reinforce the fact that the actual cost is
unclear. 
Avoiding propagating the innovation schema will likely be more
challenging.  There seems to be a tendency to defer to industry beliefs 
because the industry is seen as largely responsible for producing new 
drugs on which society relies.302  However, the goal of any responsible
pharmaceutical company is to maintain and improve its profits.303  This
is consistent with how any business that is responsible to its shareholders 
301. Scholars sometimes do this, at least in part, by not repeating the cost schema in the 
text. However, oftentimes the cost schema is still given undue representation if sources or
parentheticals reinforce the schema. 
302. See, e.g., Holman, supra note 6, at 648–49 (“[W]e should take seriously concerns
voiced by those within the industry since we as a society rely upon this industry to generate 
continuing advances in medicine and healthcare.”).  In addition, others rely on industry
representations without expressly explaining why they should be considered, let alone 
considering that the industry representations might be unreliable.  See, e.g., supra notes 
160–61 and accompanying text (demonstrating reliance by scholars). 
303. See Lawrence Perkins, Commentary, Pharmaceutical Companies Must Make 
Decisions Based on Profit, 175 W. J. MED. 422, 422 (2001).  Although some may suggest that
pharmaceutical companies have more of a social responsibility to those in need of drugs, 
this ignores the fact that companies are responsible not to the public in general but to their
shareholders, who demand a focus on the bottom line.  Id. at 423.  Nonetheless, companies 
are still sometimes evaluated and companies attempt to address this as a public relations
issue. See, e.g., ACCESS TO MEDICINE FOUNDATION, THE ACCESS TO MEDICINE INDEX 2012 8– 
11(2012), available at http://www.accesstomedicineindex.org/sites/www. accesstomedicine
index.org/files/2012-access-to-medicine-index-clickable.pdf; CONSUMERS INT’L, BRANDING 
THE CURE: A CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, DRUG 
PROMOTION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 5–7 (2006); Hans V. Hogerzeil,
Big Pharma and Social Responsibility—The Access to Medicine Index, 369 NEW. ENG. J. 
MED. 896, 897–99 (2013); Paul Hunt & Rajat Khosla, Are Drug Companies Living Up to
Their Human Rights Responsibilities? The Perspective of the Former United Nations Special 
Rapporteur (2002–2008), PLOS MED. 1–2 (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2946950/pdf/pmed.1000330.pdf; Harvey Bale Jr., The Pharmaceutical 
Industry and Corporate Social Responsibility, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.
responsible practice.com/english/insight/ifpma (last visited May 20, 2014).  In addition, 
universities, which often discover drugs that companies then develop, have also been evaluated
on the extent to which they are addressing neglected health needs. See, e.g., Rachel Marusak
Hermann, North American Universities Seen Failing To Promote Socially Responsible 
Licensing, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 5, 2013, 7:22 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/04/05/ 
north-american-universities-found-failing-to-promote-socially-responsible-licensing; University
Global Health Impact Report Card, U. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MED., http://globalhealth











   



















    
     
    
 
operates. Although the industry is often criticized for valuing profits 
over patients, it nonetheless has financial and fiduciary obligations.304 
Remembering the goal of companies is important to considering whether 
their claims relating to the schemas here should be viewed more skeptically.
The strong patent schema is the most difficult to avoid propagating, 
and yet the most important one to focus on.  As discussed in Part III,
there are serious social costs to providing more patent protection for 
drugs.305  Moreover, not only is stronger protection often trumpeted as a 
solution to inadequate drug development but also as a politically easy 
solution to follow because there is no clear “cost” in terms of taxpayer 
dollars.306 However, as discussed, there are in fact social costs; society 
may be paying for more expensive drugs that are not of clinical
significance.307 Scholars should more consistently recognize that although 
the industry relies on patent protection, providing more protection should
not be a knee-jerk reaction and assumption if the most socially desirable
innovation—NMEs that provide improved therapeutic value—is
inadequate.308 Although companies tend to suggest that any innovation
is valuable, if all innovation is priced the same to consumers and they
are unable to choose cheaper drugs of equal value, more protection will 
most likely promote more of the same type of mostly incremental
innovation.309  Studies of countries that increased patent protection of
drugs do not unambiguously support the claim that more protection leads
304. See Perkins, supra note 303, at 422–23. 
305. See supra Part III.C.3.
306. For example, Congress would not need to request appropriation spending to 
extend the term of a patent. 
307. See supra Part III.C.3.
308. There is of course some evidence that more protection can help promote 
innovation where none existed before, which has arguably happened with legislation for
orphan drugs.  See, e.g., Christopher-Paul Milne & Joyce Tait, Evolution Along 
the Government—Governance Continuum: FDA’s Orphan Products and Fast Track Programs 
as Exemplars of “What Works” for Innovation and Regulation, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
733, 740 (2009) (noting that before the Orphan Drug Act, only two or three drugs for orphan 
type diseases were approved per year, whereas an average of over eight such drugs per 
year were approved in the decade thereafter).  But see Robert Rogoyski, The Orphan
Drug Act and the Myth of the Exclusivity Incentive, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV., Apr.
15, 2006, at 1, 2 (suggesting that the patent system, rather than the Orphan Drug Act, remains
the most important motivator of drugs to address orphan diseases); David Duffield Rohde,
The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
125, 133 (2000) (suggesting that the costs of the Orphan Drug Act might not justify the
productivity benefits).  However, that is a situation of zero innovation, versus trying to
optimize the type of innovation to focus more on the most innovative drugs. 
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to more innovation—despite claims to the contrary by the industry.310  In  
addition, there is a lack of data that shows that more protection will 
result in more innovation of the right type.
Policymakers and advocates can also take steps to avoid repetition of
schemas. Information presented to the public is often presented in the 
format of “myth versus fact.”311  This may seem like a good strategy to 
clearly and succinctly rebut a schema.  However, studies indicate that the 
targeted myth may actually be reinforced, rather than rebutted, because
it is repeated.312  Problematically, this myth versus fact approach is often
adopted by advocacy groups that attempt to rebut industry views.313  In  
addition, studies show that even when individuals are informed that a
source may be biased, repetition is more influential.314  Accordingly, even 
though consumers are generally skeptical of the pharmaceutical industry, 
they are nonetheless susceptible to believing its claims because of repetition. 
2. Combating Current Schemas 
Each noted schema could be better challenged by not only additional 
studies that rebut the schema but also greater dissemination of studies
that challenge those schemas.  Notably, although there are some studies
that challenge these schemas, they often receive a mere fraction of the
attention that the schemas do. This subpart explains how each schema
could be better challenged. 
Scholars and policymakers can challenge the cost schema through 
contrary studies. This, admittedly, may be difficult because companies 
zealously guard their cost data, such that the only researchers with access to
substantial data are those associated with the industry-supported Tufts 
Center that perpetuates the cost schema.  However, the tide of public and 
political opinion seems to be shifting to require more public disclosure 
310. See supra Part III.C.2.
 311. E.g., Brook K. Baker, Debunking Pharma’s Cant Against the Novartis Judgment: 
Myth and Fact, HEALTH GLOBAL ACCESS PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2013), http://healthgap.org/blog/
2013/4/3/debunking-pharmas-cant-against-the-novartis-judgment-myth-and-fact; Myth-Buster, 
TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
10/TAC_MythBuster_Patent_Reform.pdf (last visited May 20, 2014). 
312. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
313. E.g., Baker, supra note 311. 













    
   









   




    
 
    
     
    
     
 
  
      
    
         
  
     
 
 
of industry data, such that perhaps cost data may ultimately be accessible 
to robust research.315  In the meantime, scholars and policymakers can 
challenge the schema by better citing and propagating contrary numbers 
that have a sound empirical basis.  Although some have criticized the 
industry numbers in the past, if the criticism is accompanied by overly
critical views of the industry or not vigorously supported, those criticisms 
can be easily dismissed.316 
315. For example, there is increasing pressure to require companies to provide all 
clinical data, including unpublished studies.  E.g., Trial and Experimental Studies Transparency
(TEST) Act of 2012, H.R. 6272, 112th Cong. (2012); Daniel Cressey, Drug-Company
Data Vaults To Be Opened: European Agency Will Publish Firms’ Clinical-Trial Results, 
495 NATURE 419, 419–20 (2013), available at http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/
1.12679!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/495419a.pdf; Jeffrey M. Drazen,
Transparency for Clinical Trials—The TEST Act, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 863, 863–64 
(2012); Fiona Godlee, Clinical Trial Data for All Drugs in Current Use Must Be Made 
Available for Independent Scrutiny, BRIT. MED. J., Oct. 29, 2012, at 1, 2; Katie Thomas, 
Breaking the Seal on Drug Research, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2013, at BU1.  Not surprisingly, 
the industry is resistant.  E.g., PhRMA Statement on Clinical Trials and Bad Pharma, 
PHRMA (Feb. 4, 2013), http://phrma.org/media/releases/phrma-statement-clinical- trials-bad-
pharma; Ian Sample, Big Pharma Mobilising Patients in Battle over Drugs Trials Data, 
GUARDIAN (July 21, 2013, 2:44 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/ 2013/jul/21/big- 
pharma-secret-drugs-trials.  However, the pressure has been effective in resulting in a
voluntary agreement to release some clinical data.  E.g., PHRMA, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
CLINICAL TRIAL DATA SHARING: OUR COMMITMENT TO PATIENTS AND RESEARCHERS
(2013), available at  http://phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMAPrinciplesForResponsible 
ClinicalTrialDataSharing.pdf; Katie Thomas, Drug Companies Promise More Data 
Transparency, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at B6; Hester Plumridge, Proposed Law Would
Require More Drug-Trial Transparency, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303802104579449160147006896; Note
from the Gen. Secretariat, Council of the European Union, to Delegations (Dec. 20, 2013), 
available at http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/00/78/EU_07823/imfname
_10428837.pdf.
316. For example, although a doctor questioned the cost of drug discovery in a book 
highly critical of the industry, the general tenor of the book made it easy for the industry
to quickly dismiss it. See  MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES
(2003); see also Richard A. Epstein, Pharma Furor: Why Two High-Profile Attacks on
Big Drug Companies Flunk the Test of Basic Economics, LEGAL AFF., Jan/.Feb. 2005, at 56
(criticizing Angell’s “extended indictment” as reflecting an “inability to grasp fundamental 
economic principles”).  Similarly, a recent book by two economists that challenged the 
importance of patents on pharmaceuticals contained some overstatements that perhaps
made it predictably ignored by most patent scholars.  See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 252.
For example, although others have noted that many drugs are not innovative, the approach
that these authors take seems not duly tailored. Id. at 228. They claim that it is reasonable to
ask medical doctors about innovative medicines; however, the study that they cite is not
limited to medicine and in fact also discusses medical discoveries. Id. (citing Petra Moser,
How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World
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More study and dissemination are also needed to address the innovation 
and strong patent schemas.  Some scholars are beginning to provide
empirical analysis of the impact of so-called “secondary” patents that cover 
not the original active ingredient in a new drug but alternative formulations
or methods of administration.317  These secondary patents are less
innovative yet may nonetheless bar approval of generic drugs.318  Two  
researchers recently evaluated two key HIV drugs and found that there
were 108 related patents, which together could delay generic competition
until at least 2028—twelve years after the expiration of the patents on 
the original active ingredients.319  Similarly, a different group of researchers,
including Law Professor Amy Kapczynski, recently published an 
empirical study that revealed that the majority of drugs are protected by
multiple secondary patents.320  These studies also echo findings of the 
claim that only two of the fifteen innovations were patented, the list includes many nondrug 
discoveries, such as x-rays, tissue culture, public sanitation, evidence-based vaccines, and 
even computers. Id. at 229. Similarly, they claim that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention’s top ten list of public health achievements in the twentieth century 
yielded no medical patents, but this list is for the broad category of public health, and not 
pharmaceuticals.  Id. They may perhaps realize that these numbers are misrepresentative 
because they ultimately do consult a “List of Top Pharmaceuticals” from the Chemical and 
Engineering News magazine, which they claim should “stack the odds in favor of patents.” 
Id.  Of this list of forty-six best selling drugs at the time of the 2005 survey, they claim that for
almost half, “[p]atents had pretty much nothing to do with the development,” whereas the 
remaining products “somehow owe their existence to the availability of drug patents.”  Id. 
at 230.  However, this list suffers the same problems as the others in not being focused solely
on pharmaceuticals—despite its title. See id.  The top-selling “drugs” include medical
marijuana and vitamins.  Id.  In addition, they provide no evidence for their claim of why 
patents had no connection to certain drugs, such as Allegra, Prozac, Viagra and Vioxx. Id.
Similarly, although certain drugs were discovered by chance and patented, or made in 
university labs, this does not discount the fact that the availability of patent protection,
although perhaps not essential to initial creation, could have been essential to commercialization
of the product.
317. See, e.g., Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded 
Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended
for Decades, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2286, 2291 (2012); Kapczynski et al., supra note 279. 
318. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 279, at 1.
319. Amin & Kesselheim, supra note 317, at 2291. 
320. Kapczynski, supra note 279, at 4; see also Andrew F. Christie et al., Patents 
Associated with High-Cost Drugs in Australia, PLOS ONE 6 (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.
plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.00608 
12 &representation=PDF (discussing similar results with a focus on Australian patents). 






















         
    
      
      
  




    
 
European Union’s comprehensive 2009 study of the pharmaceutical 
industry.321 
However, these critical research results do not garner much public 
attention.322 This may in part be because the story of secondary patents is 
a nuanced and complex one that includes uncommon terms, such as 
polymorphs and prodrugs, that have less resonance than the simple and 
emotionally powerful schemas of the industry.
Beyond considering secondary patents, research on the cost of drugs
focusing on drugs that are not NMEs, or at least not lumping together 
such molecules with IMD, is definitely needed. It is unclear to this
Author why there seems to be a paucity of such research.  In the past two 
decades, the Budget Office suggested that such drugs cost a third of
NMEs, but there seems to be no recent data on this issue.323  However, 
whereas the cost schema is repeated as the cost of all drugs when it is at
best representative of a minority of drugs, there exists no solid data on
the cost of the majority of new drugs, which are in fact incremental
innovations.  Of course, there could be challenges in considering all
incremental drugs together because some may be slower or faster to
develop.  However, that seems equally true of NMEs.  At a minimum, 
some comparative data is necessary to help drive home the point that the 
oft-repeated figure is at best accurate for only one part of the cost spectrum. 
In addition, patents are not the only protection relied on by the
industry to protect drugs.  Other protections include patent linkage and
data exclusivity, which are explained in more detail in the next subpart. 
Given that the industry also relies on these, research that addresses them
in addition to patents is a priority to understand the full impact of 
pharmaceutical protectionism.  One team of Canadian scholars has begun to
ten years, this study suggests that secondary patents may result in an additional four or five
years of protection, which would make the effective patent term of pharmaceuticals much
closer to that of other inventions and argue against providing additional protection. Compare
Kapczynski et al., supra note 279, with Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective
Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98 (2000). 
321. EUROPEAN COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY: FINAL REPORT 521
(2009).
322. The study of HIV drugs does not seem to have captured much attention in the 
United States beyond a few blogs. E.g., Jessica Bylander, The Indian Supreme Court Weighs 
in on “Patent Evergreening,”  HEALTH AFF. BLOG (April 3, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2013/04/03/the-indian-supreme-court-weighs-in-on-patent-evergreening; Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Kapczynski, Park & Sampat on Secondary Pharma Patents, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2013/01/kapczynski-park-sampat-on-
secondary.html. 
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do this and found that the nexus of patents and patent linkage promotes 
more incremental drugs of modest clinical significance.324  However, the
work of this team of Canadian scholars is minimally cited by U.S. scholars,
and there do not appear to be any parallel U.S. studies that focus on both
patents and patent linkage.325 
A more challenging task is changing the popular discourse in the 
media that to date has largely reinforced the schemas.  Admittedly, the 
schemas may be easy to reinforce because they tend to be simple and 
memorable stories—which make for good journalism—when the reality 
is more nuanced.  Although journalists are unlikely to change their methods,
perhaps schemas can nonetheless be challenged by providing journalists 
with press releases and other information that they can easily rely on. 
Another challenging task is to change the discourse of scholars and
policymakers.  As noted in Part II, there are already scholars that recognize 
the schemas, but their work has generally not infiltrated or influenced
most patent scholarship and policymaking.  This may be in part because
the group of scholars that recognize the schemas—without calling them 
as such—may be so focused on the goal of promoting access to lower
cost medicine that most patent scholars view these scholars as an
opposing group that is against patents and thus reject what they have to
324. Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug Patenting 
Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 174, 174–75, 225– 
27 (2010); Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and
Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1463–64 (2009). 
325. A Westlaw search revealed only two scholarly articles that cite Bouchard’s 
conclusions; however, neither of these articles focuses primarily on the issue of the role
of patent or regulatory laws on drug innovation. See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley,
Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 947, 950–51, 954 n.30 (2011); Benjamin P. Liu, Fighting Poison with Poison? The
Chinese Experience with Pharmaceutical Patent Linkage, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 623, 625–27, 671–72 (2012).  In addition, Bouchard’s empirical studies are cited for
different issues. See, e.g., Kali Murray & Esther van Zimmeren, Dynamic Patent Governance
in Europe and the United States: The Myriad Example, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
287, 335 n.186 (2011) (general pharmaceutical patent litigation); Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change), 62 
EMORY L.J. 1087, 1131 n.184 (2013) (environmental law).  Although there is a dearth of
empirical data on the intersection of patents and patent linkage on U.S. drug innovation, the
problems of patent linkage in general are recognized. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker, Ending
Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 








    
  
     
     
 





    
    
       
 
  




   
   
   
     
say. Accordingly, perhaps some scholars and advocates who recognize 
problems with patent laws in pharmaceuticals can and should be careful 
not to take a strident tone.326  However, broader steps likely need to be
taken to change the discussion to ensure that the problems caused by 
stronger patent protection on pharmaceuticals do not continue to be an
issue addressed by an isolated group of scholars.  One possibility is an
institutional change to focus on such policy implications of patents, such 
as innovation, that are not captured by the industry.327 
B. Less Is More: Patent Policy Should Consider       
Promoting More Innovative Drugs 
One implication of the schemas is that scholars and policymakers 
should take a more skeptical view of popular claims for additional 
protection to promote pharmaceutical innovation.  After all, more protection 
may simply lead to an exacerbation of the existing situation: promoting 
mostly incremental innovation of minimal clinical value.  At a time when
326. Some recent books that raise valid points about patents on pharmaceuticals may be
easily discounted because of their strident tone.  For example, the book by economists Boldrin 
and Levine is not only antagonistic in its title, which refers to intellectual monopoly instead of
intellectual property, but the content of the text is also very slanted.  BOLDRIN & LEVINE, 
supra note 252, at 234 (“[A] monopolized industry, where patents are the core and foundation 
of the business method adopted, must end up practicing rent seeking and bribery, it must
conceal or suppress relevant research findings, it must monitor doctors’ prescription behavior,
it must employ a sales force three times the size of its research team, and it must, finally,
become one of the top donors of political campaign contributions.”).  It is perhaps unsurprising 
that the insights of this book are generally not included in scholarly discussions, except
as an example of a contrary view on eliminating intellectual property.  See, e.g., Scott Baker,
Can the Courts Rescue Us from the Patent Crisis?, 88 TEX. L. REV. 593, 599 n.39 (2010)
(reviewing DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT (2009)) (citing the book as a “but see” cite to the normally accepted premise 
that patents do in fact work); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. 
L. REV. 709, 738, 750 (2012); see also Ron A. Bouchard et al., Structure-Function Analysis of
Global Pharmaceutical Linkage Regulations, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 391, 394 n.3
(2011) (including the book in a string cite about how patent law is controversial for 
stimulating drug development, but also including other cites that tend to suggest that 
patents are beneficial to drug discovery); Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention
Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 414 n.144 (2012) (citing book as a “see also” cite to the cost 
of drug discovery).
327. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008) (proposing a new agency to analyze innovation 
policy); see also Salomeh Keyhani & Alex Federman, Fact or Fiction: The Need for
Independent Pharmaceutical Policy Research, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 692, 693 (2009) 
(suggesting the need for independent policy research to provide neutral information to 
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the pharmaceutical industry is producing fewer new drugs and claiming
that its ability to fund new drug development is compromised by increased
competition from generics, the industry should be expected to seek more
protection. Accordingly, a more skeptical view is particularly important
now. 
Although probably difficult to implement, it is relatively straightforward 
to outline how to modify, or at least contradict, the current schema that
favors more protection. Essentially, the current presumptions should be 
reversed. So, for example, instead of a lenient standard of patentability
to arguably encourage more innovation—of any type—the standard of 
patentability could be applied more rigorously by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  This would be a major change to not only
existing law but also what most patent scholars have advocated.328 
Although arguably iconoclastic with respect to domestic policy, there is 
precedent in the international arena. In particular, India, as well as some
other developing countries do not permit patents on new uses of existing
compounds or even “new” compounds that are slight variations of existing 
compounds, unless there is proof of increased clinical significance.329 
The Indian Supreme Court recently affirmed application of this law to
deny Novartis a patent.330  This decision has prompted widespread 
discussion and consideration of modifying patent laws, even among 
wealthy countries.331  In addition, although this decision shines a spotlight 
on this issue, some countries had already been considering this problem.332 
328. Although U.S. patent scholars have generally not advocated a heightened level 
of scrutiny for pharmaceutical patents, others have.  See, e.g., Molly F.M. Chen, Note, 
Reconsidering the U.S. Patent System: Lessons from Generics, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1249, 1253 (2013). 
329. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d); 
Divya Rajagopal, EU, Australia, Canada May Follow India’s Patent Law, ECON. TIMES
(April 4, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-04-04/news/
38278712_1_patent-act-patent-protection-patent-quality.
330. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) ___S.C.R. ___ (India), available at http:// 
indiankanoon. org/doc/165776436. 
331. Rajagopal, supra note 329. 
332. Canadian courts have in fact recently recognized the “promise doctrine,” as a
subset of the utility requirement, which has been used to limit patentability of drugs in
cases of evergreening by requiring the patent application to disclose any claimed utility
in the application.  See Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2011] F.C.A. 236 (Can.), available 
at http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/site/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/37251/index.do; Eli Lilly Canada







   
 
  






     
 
         
  
   
    
    
 




   
    
       
 
 





India’s particular approach does have some practical problems in that it may
be difficult to evaluate clinical significance when a patent application is
filed.  Similarly, Canada’s current approach of imposing a stringent utility 
doctrine to pharmaceutical inventions could possibly be better tailored to 
address fairness concerns.  However, logistical challenges alone in crafting
an appropriate standard to promote the right type of innovation should
not completely thwart consideration of how to best promote drug
innovation.  Moreover, this should not be a new phenomenon. After all,
for years, scholars and policymakers have been discussing how to better
tailor patent standards to ensure that patents are granted for deserving 
innovations.333 
In addition, although patent law is traditionally a “one size fits all” 
reward, perhaps there could be better tailoring of patent rewards. In 
other words, perhaps more innovative drugs should get a longer patent 
term.  The current law already permits some deviations of the standard 
patent term, although those are largely to compensate for delays in
ca/site/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/36863/index.do.  At least one commentator has criticized this 
doctrine.  See Norman Siebrasse, The False Doctrine of False Promise, 29 CANADIAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 3 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2171762.  Eli Lilly filed a formal challenge in September, seeking monetary
damages pursuant to an international investment arbitration based on its claim that Canada’s 
law is inconsistent with international law, although a number of commentators have cast doubt 
on the validity of Eli Lilly’s claim. Notice of Arbitration, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Canada
(Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Eli-Lilly-
Notice-of-Arbitration-September-12-2013.pdf; see  PUBLIC CITIZEN, U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL
CORPORATION USES NAFTA FOREIGN INVESTOR PRIVILEGES REGIME TO ATTACK CANADA’S 
PATENT POLICY, DEMAND $100 MILLION FOR INVALIDATION OF A PATENT (2013), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/eli-lilly-investor-state-factsheet.pdf; Brook K. Baker,
Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines—
Eli Lilly and the TPP, PIJIP RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (May 1, 2013), http://digitalcommons.
wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=research. Regardless of how the 
arbitration is resolved, Canada’s promise doctrine remains an example of a country besides
India that has attempted to restrict patents on drugs that seem not particularly innovative. 
Australia also seems to agree.  AUSTRALIAN REPORT, supra note 61, at x, xvi (noting that
although “it is logical that patentees will seek further patents for improvements to their 
drugs—so called follow-on patents—with an eye to extending the market life of the original
drug,” there is a need for more rigorous review of attempts to patent that do not in fact meet 
patentability standards).
333. Discussions have focused on the “nonobvious” standard of patent law.  See, 
e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, supra note 326, at 21–22 (noting that the patent
system is broken and it is highly likely that the USPTO has been too lenient in granting
patents in recent decades); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 43, at 4–8; NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 87–101 (recommending a reinvigoration of the nonobviousness 
standard and a post-grant review procedure).  However, these reports focus primarily on 
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evaluation by the USPTO or the inevitable lag time between patent
application and usual approval by the FDA that cuts into the effective 
patent term.334  So, the concept of modifying the patent term is on its
face not novel.  Of course, the suggestion to modify patent terms based
on the level of innovativeness is dramatically different than current
patent term adjustments that are based on clear cut situations.  Admittedly,
there are challenges to determining what inventions are more worthwhile 
and thus deserving of a longer term, especially at the stage of a patent 
application, which often occurs earlier than the clinical tests that would 
establish the value. However, logistical problems alone are not a sound
justification for not considering how to improve the current system.335 
Rather, they simply suggest that a new method is perhaps necessary.
Although firm details of a new method are beyond the scope of this 
Article, a brief discussion may help to show that such a method need not 
be beyond consideration.  For example, perhaps for patented drugs, the 
time to apply for an extension would not happen when the patent 
application is filed, or even when granted, but when application for FDA 
approval occurs. At that time, clinical data would exist because that is a
pre-requisite to obtaining regulatory approval to sell drugs.336  In addition,
one possibility is to grant more time to priority NMEs.  Of course, such 
a proposal is likely to be strenuously opposed by the industry; indeed, 
the objections would likely mirror past objections to the use of FDA 
criteria in evaluating innovativeness.337  However, this is simply an
example of what would be administratively easy.  If there were a
different way that innovativeness could be assessed that the industry
agreed with, that could of course be used.  However, the bigger problem
is that because the industry has confirmation bias that everything it
produces is innovative, it would strongly object to any and all suggestions 
of innovativeness that change the current system.338  Nonetheless, because
334.  35 U.S.C. §§ 155–156 (2012). 
335. It is also possible to promote this goal without touching the patent term.  For
example, innovative drugs could be granted more market protection through data exclusivity.
Congress has previously used data exclusivity to incentivize desired innovation in specific 
areas, such as drugs for children and antibiotics. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 801 (2012). 
336. See How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved (last updated Feb. 13, 2014). 
337. See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text. 





     


















   
   




   
 
the proposal is to provide more patent term, as a carrot, perhaps there is
some possibility—even if slim—that this is something that could be 
framed in a way that would be acceptable. 
Even if patent laws are not modified, they could be better policed by 
the USPTO to ensure that patents are not improperly granted.  Although 
invalid patents can be challenged in litigation, such litigation is expensive 
and may be practically difficult.  Once issued, a patent is given a
presumption of validity.339 As a matter of public policy, there seems to
be no compelling case against a more rigorous application of existing
requirements of patentability before a patent is issued.340 
One traditional mechanism to reinforce existing patentability requirements 
is to permit third parties to challenge patent applications before they
issue as patents with a presumption of validity.  European countries have 
followed this policy for years.341  However, there are serious practical 
challenges to incorporating such an approach in the United States because
of international agreements—often prompted by PhRMA—that preclude 
the United States from doing so.342  Even if there is not political will to
overcome these agreements, that does not mean that this approach is
sound policy.
In addition, even if post-grant review is not possible, that does not 
mean that review within the USPTO cannot be enhanced.  For example, 
following public outcry about business method patents of questionable 
quality, the USPTO instituted a second level of review.343  This type of
review could easily be extended to patents beyond business methods. 
339. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).  Some have questioned this presumption.  See, e.g., 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 43, at 26–28; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007). 
Nonetheless, that is the current law and unlikely to change.
340. Indeed, in discussions leading up to the recent major overhaul of patent laws, 
a major criticism was that the standard of obviousness was too leniently applied. See, e.g., 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 59–63. 
341. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 115, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 199 (as amended Sept. 2013) (permitting the public to comment on patentability of
pending patent applications); see also Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks To Create a Better 
Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 780 (2002) (advocating pregrant oppositions). 
342. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.9(5), June 15, 2004, 
44 I.L.M. 544 [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., art.
18.8(4), Mar. 15, 2012, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade- 
agreements/korus-fta/final-text.
343. See Richard Maulsby, Under Secretary Dickinson Initiates Action Plan for Business 
Method Patents, USPTO TODAY, Apr. 2000, at 5–7 (outlining the USPTO’s Business 
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This is not to suggest that this is the only solution to improve drug 
innovation.  Rather, it is simply an example of how some structural changes,
even without changing the law, could potentially be beneficial and even
have some precedence. 
Similarly, another possibility could be to change how drug patents are 
considered after issuance.  In particular, given the statistics that many 
challenged drug patents that are found invalid or not infringed,344 
perhaps such patents should not be entitled to a presumption of validity. 
This may sound completely radical, but it was actually proposed at one
point to address the problem of business method patents.345  In addition, 
any such proposal would need to be considered in conjunction with other
types of protections that companies rely on and that are also relevant to 
the schema that currently promotes more protection of drugs.
In particular, regulatory laws provide important complementary 
protection to patents for the pharmaceutical industry.  As discussed below,
“patent linkage” and “data exclusivity” could be modified to reduce
overprotection of incremental innovation to promote more breakthrough
innovation.
Patent linkage bars the FDA from approving a proposed generic drug
that is linked or associated with a patent that relates to an already
approved drug, such that a proposed generic drug would arguably infringe
the linked patent if made and sold.346  This helps protect existing patented
drugs from competition and is justified by the industry as an efficient
means to prevent patent infringement.347  Importantly, the FDA makes
such decisions based solely on information provided by the drug
companies.348  The FDA has taken the position that it is not legally required 
to determine whether the linked patents are valid, and courts have thus 
344. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
345. See Business Method Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001).
346. CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 273 (2011). 
347. Id.
348. The information is listed in what is referred to as the “Orange Book” and is 
based on information submitted to the FDA as part of new drug applications concerning 
what patents are associated with the drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012); FDA, APPROVED





   
 
 













   
  
   
  
    
    
      
    
 
     
    
  
   
far blessed this approach.349  This has resulted in a system that has been 
abused to preclude generic competition.  Proposed generics can challenge
the validity or arguable infringement of the listed patents but only in a
limited window and at great cost because patent litigation is notoriously
expensive.350  Notably, generic companies win more than seventy percent of
such challenges, suggesting that the patent linkage system is not only 
flawed but also provides overprotection of patented drugs at great social 
cost.351  Even more problematically, although generics can challenge
patents, they sometimes choose not to because they are paid by patent 
holders not to do so, which has been dubbed “pay for delay.”352  The
U.S. Supreme Court recently held that this can violate antitrust laws, but
it remains to be seen whether this will reduce such socially problematic
settlements.353 
Patent linkage is a concept that is well known to those who advocate 
for better access to lower cost generic drugs, but it is almost never discussed 
by patent scholars who advocate for stronger protection of drugs. 
However, patent linkage exacerbates overly strong patent rights in that it
provides a de facto injunction against generic companies before any
commercial sales ever take place and without a judicial hearing that 
would evaluate the likelihood of success of a patent suit or a consideration 
of the equities.354 
Patent linkage could be eliminated, or at least modified, to minimize
its harms.  Politically, eliminating patent linkage is unlikely, not only
because of expected resistance from the pharmaceutical industry but also
because the industry has successfully lobbied the government to enact
349. See, e.g., Alphapharm Pty Ltd. v. Thompson, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2004). 
350. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012) (prohibiting a generic manufacturer
from submitting an application to the FDA until five years after approval of the pioneer 
NME); Maurice Ross, Leveling the Playing Field—The Role of Venture Capital in 
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 79 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 730, 730–31 (2010).
351. E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION
13 (2002); ADAM GREENE & D. DEWEY STEADMAN, RBC CAPITAL MARKETS CORP., 
PHARMACEUTICALS: ANALYZING LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 4 (2010), available at http:// 
amlawdaily.typepad.com/pharmareport.pdf. 
352. E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS 
COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 1 (2010).
353. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234–35 (2013). 
354. For a discussion of the public policy concerns, see, for example, HO, supra
note 346, at 253–81; WORLD HEALTH ORG., BRIEFING NOTE ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES: 
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international agreements that require linkage.355  However, it could
nonetheless be modified to minimize harm.  For example, the FDA 
could permit the list of patents to be periodically audited based on 
information from third parties and perhaps involve the USPTO or 
another entity to help evaluate this information.356  In addition, generic
companies could be permitted to challenge the validity or claimed
infringement of drugs earlier.357 
The second type of regulatory protection that is important to
protecting incremental innovation is data exclusivity.  Essentially, the
first company to seek and obtain approval for a new drug can prevent a
generic company from relying on its supporting clinical data for a 
certain period of time.358  This is important because generic companies
generally do not have the financial resources to replicate the large 
clinical trials necessary to obtain approval; moreover, apart from cost, it
is arguably unethical to subject patients to unnecessary clinical trials. 
Accordingly, it is well accepted in the United States and many other 
countries that a generic version of a previously approved drug will be 
approved if the generic company can provide more limited and far less 
expensive studies to show that its proposed generic is bioequivalent to
the previously approved drug; rather than doing extensive clinical tests 
355. E.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Cent. Am.-Dom. Rep., art. 15.10(3), Aug.
5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-
dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text; U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 342, at
art. 15.10(4); Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248, art. 
17.10(5); Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.10(2), June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026; 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16(8)(4)(c), May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026; see also
PHRMA, SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2012 12 (2012) (recommending that countries prevent
marketing of products that would potentially infringe, which is patent linkage); Ruth Lopert & 
Deborah Gleeson, The High Price of “Free” Trade: U.S. Trade Agreements and Access to
Medicines, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 199–200 (2013) (discussing the strategy of using
free trade agreements to address issues not in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)). 
356. See, e.g., HEALTH CANADA, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE
OF COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS (2012) (permitting third parties to challenge patents). 
357. Currently, generic companies must wait to be sued before they can challenge a 
linked patent. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2013).  Only if sued can a generic 
manufacturer challenge whether the patent was inappropriately listed, an issue that the 
Court recently addressed in Caraco Pharm. Labs. Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670,
1688 (2012).




   














      
 
      
 
 
    
  
  
to establish safety and efficacy of the proposed generic, the limited 
bioequivalence testing is used in conjunction with reliance on the 
extensive data submitted by the original manufacturer to infer that the 
proposed generic would be similarly safe and effective.359  Data exclusivity
can be rationalized as granting the originator necessary protection to 
prevent freeriding by a second entrant who does not bear the costs.360 
However, in the United States, not only is there data exclusivity for a 
brand new molecule but also an additional period of data exclusivity for 
each new use of the molecule after the exclusivity ends for the new 
molecule.361 Essentially, this additional exclusivity encourages companies
to look for new uses.  The exclusivity for a new use is shorter than for 
new drugs—three versus five years.362  However, if new uses are
substantially less costly to develop than a new drug, it would seem logical
to focus on these new uses; indeed, such new uses are the majority of newly
approved drugs in the United States.363 
Resisting more protection is especially important with respect to data
exclusivity.  The United States recently granted a much longer period of 
data exclusivity for so-called biologics,364 which are the newest and 
generally most expensive type of pharmaceuticals and are prevalent in
the treatments for important conditions such as cancer.365  Unlike most 
drugs that get a five-year term of exclusivity, biologics get a twelve-year 
term.366  This is true even though empirical studies do not show that
biologics have vastly different development costs than traditional 
drugs.367  Moreover, some have suggested that this twelve-year term be
expanded to all drugs; this is likely driven by the same motivation for 
increased patent protection because exclusivity provided by the FDA is
an independent method for companies to maintain a competitive 
359. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(i)-(iv) (2012). 
360. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N PHARM. MFRS. & ASS’NS, ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW
CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 1–2 (2000), available 
at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/en/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf. 
361. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)-(iv) (2012). By contrast, there is no such additional 
period provided in Europe. 
362. See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012). 
363.  See CBO STUDY, supra note 66, at 7. 
364.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2012). 
365. See  ALEX M. BRILL, PROPER DURATION OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR GENERIC 
BIOLOGICS: A CRITIQUE 5 (2008). 
366.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2012). 
367. See, e.g., BRILL, supra note 365, at 4, 11 (suggesting seven years of data 
exclusivity for biologics); DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 128, at 470 (noting that both 
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advantage.368 However, even for conventional drugs, there is no clear 
economic case suggesting that five years is the appropriate time; in the 
past, some have suggested that Congress consider a shorter term because 
of the social costs to society.369  Accordingly, resisting a longer period of
data exclusivity for conventional drugs is another important issue to be
considered in conjunction with changing defaults for patent protection.
C. Schemas for Further Consideration 
Although this Article has focused primarily on cognitive biases that 
stem from a self-interest bias, there may be additional cognitive biases at
a cultural level that deserve further consideration and evaluation.  This 
subpart briefly sketches these issues.
1. Is There a Cultural Belief That Newer Is Better? 
The first possible schema is an assumption that newer is necessarily 
better.370  This is arguably related to the industry self-interest bias that it
368. E.g., Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 89. 
369. Legislative Proposal To Increase Funding for Medical Research: Hearing
Before Subcomm. on Dep’ts of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and
Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 18 (1997) (statement of
James P. Love, Director, Consumer Project on Technology). 
370. This Article focuses on newer medical treatments, although there could be a 
general preference for new products.  More importantly, there could also be a schema that
assumes that unless newer treatments are favored, there is improper rationing or government 
interference, or both.  However, the term rationing seems inappropriate with respect to 
not spending money on expensive goods that are not clearly better.  This approach may
seem radical in the context of a freewheeling market economy that drug manufacturers
prefer.  However, given that patients have inaccurate information to compare drugs, even
assuming they have a role in which drug they take, this is not necessarily either rationing
or government interference.  To the contrary, some governments consider this entirely rational.
See, e.g., Ruth Lopert, Evidence-Based Decision-Making Within Australia’s Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme, COMMONWEALTH FUND, July 2009, at 7; Jane Merrick, “Too Expensive” 
Cystic Fibrosis Drug is Blocked Due to Expense, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 21, 2012), http://
www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/too-expensive-cystic-fibrosis-
drug-is-blocked-due-to-expense-8219524.html; Helen Pidd, Avastin Prolongs Life but is
Too Expensive for NHS Patients, Says Nice, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www. 
theguardian.com/society/2010/aug/24/avastin-too-expensive-for-patients.  Of course, skeptics 
might question whether these countries have comparable levels of innovation. However, 
as noted above, even in an environment where pharmaceutical companies have their desired





   
 
   











   
      




     







is developing innovative new drugs.  There also may be a cultural bias 
among the health care sector, or society as a whole, that also fosters this 
belief.371  For example, as many consumers know, doctors often suggest
trying newer drugs.  This may be complicated by the fact that there are
often free samples of newer drugs and doctors sometimes have relations 
with companies that make them biased towards promoting new drugs.372 
However, society as a whole may still seem to have a general presumption 
that newer is better.373 
A recent story suggests that some doctors believe there may be such a 
schema.  Doctors from the renowned Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer 
371. See Francisco Javier Garjón et al., Adoption of New Drugs by Physicians: A 
Survival Analysis, BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1 (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.biomed
central.com/content/pdf/1472-6963-12-56.pdf (noting that new drugs often substitute for 
cheaper ones).  In addition, although doctors may recognize that new drugs might have 
risks, there is some indication that patients do not.  WAYNE D. HOYER ET AL., CONSUMER 
BEHAVIOR 422 (6th ed. 2013).  This can be a problem because newer drugs with the same
therapeutic value may have unknown side effects that expose patients to greater safety
issues compared to drugs already on the market.  After all, although drugs must establish
a basic level of safety to be approved by the FDA, that is based on much more limited
data than years or even decades of knowledge that develop after a drug is approved. See
Garjón et al., supra, at 6 (noting that new drugs are adopted before safety is well 
established because clinical trials involve limited patients for short duration that are
unlikely to be representative of all patients and suggesting that some recommend waiting
at least seven years before using a new drug to better identify adverse effects).  In the
1990s, all the drugs withdrawn from the market for safety reasons were drugs that did not
fill new medical needs. E.g., Daniel Sigelman, Dangerous Medicine, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 5, 
2002), http://prospect.org/article/dangerous-medicine. 
372. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS 2 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/105xx/ 
doc10522/12-02-drugpromo_brief.pdf; David Grande, Limiting the Influence of Pharmaceutical 
Industry Gifts on Physicians: Self-Regulation or Government Intervention?, 25 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 79, 79 (2010); Daniel Carlat, Dr. Drug Rep, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 25,
2007, at E64, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/magazine/25memoir-t.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.  Moreover, the influence of companies starts in medical school. See,
e.g., Melena Bellin et al., Medical Students’ Exposure to Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing:
A Survey at One U.S. Medical School, 79 ACAD. MED. 1041, 1044 (2004); Pauline W. 
Chen, For Medical Students, Love from the Drug Rep, N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG (Oct. 3,
2013, 3:24 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2013/10/03/for-med-students-love-from-
the-drug-rep.
373. E.g., Michael D. Dalzell, Pushback on Zaltrap’s Price Highlights Sensitive
End-of-Life Issue, MANAGED CARE (Dec. 2012), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/ 
1212/1212.zaltrap.html (“[T]he culture in medicine—and oncology is no exception—often is
‘newer is better,’ regardless of a drug’s outcomes or costs.”); Vitry et al., supra note 211, 
at 1 (“[T]he belief that all new medicines bring a therapeutic innovation and better health 

























    
 
  










[VOL. 51:  419, 2014] How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Center recently announced that they would not use a cancer drug because it
was not better than existing treatments but was priced twice as high.374 
They noted that because there is a presumption in the medical culture 
that equates new with better, their decision to reject a new drug that 
offers no significant benefit and costs twice as much as prior drugs was
hard to make.375 In addition, other cancer doctors are questioning the
cost of many new cancer drugs that offer marginal extensions of life.376 
There is also some historical evidence that seems to support a schema 
favoring new drugs.377  In particular, in the 1980s, new antihypertensives
designed to treat high blood pressure—known as ACE inhibitors— 
quickly became top sellers whereas sales of older and cheaper treatments,
such as diuretics, plummeted despite a strong price differential.378  The 
generic diuretics cost around $40 compared to $700 for the patented
ones.379  Remarkably, the quick market response happened without any 
studies to establish that the newer drugs were better.  As noted earlier, 
such studies are not required for FDA approval.  Nonetheless, it would 
seem logical that doctors would not prescribe newer and more expensive
drugs unless there was evidence that they were better.  This example,
however, shows that is not necessarily the case.  After nearly two decades, a
374. Peter B. Bach et al., Op-Ed., In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2012, at A25.
 375. Id.
 376. See, e.g., Laura Beil, The Cancer “Breakthroughs” that Cost Too Much and 
Do Too Little, NEWSWEEK, http://www.newsweek.com/cancer-breakthroughs-cost-too-much-
and-do-too-little-64531 (last updated Aug. 27, 2012, 10:02 PM). 
377. The same phenomenon may also be true for medical treatment in general, and 
not just regarding drugs.  For example, a newer “metal on metal” hip replacement was widely
adopted, representing a third of all hip replacements in 2007, but was recently discovered
to in fact be inferior to prior models, including a 2010 recall of Johnson & Johnson
products, because metal ions leached into the bloodstream and twice as many revisions 
were needed, even though the product was not recalled completely. E.g., Rupert Shepherd,
Metal on Metal Hip Implants Causing Big Problems Again, MED. NEWS TODAY (June
27, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/ 247151.php; see also
Vinay Prasad & Adam Cifu, Medical Reversal: Why We Must Raise the Bar Before
Adopting New Technologies, 84 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 471, 471–72 (describing the 
broad phenomenon that medical therapies and diagnoses are often too quickly adopted
and then subsequently reversed). 
378. See ANGELL, supra note 316, at 96–97. 
379. See Ron Winslow & Scott Hensley, Dose of Reality: Study Questions High-


















   
     
     
   
  
    
      
    
 
      
 
   
   
  
 
study by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) conclusively determined 
that the newer drugs were not only not significantly better but, in fact, were 
worse in some respects, such that generic diuretics were recommended 
as the preferred first step for treating high blood pressure.380 
A schema that assumes that newer drugs are necessarily better can 
have dangerous implications when combined with drug company marketing
and testing. In particular, whereas the ACE inhibitor situation establishes
that new drugs with no established significant improvements are quickly
adopted, in situations where companies tout supposed benefits, doctors 
should be expected to adopt them.  Although this seems reasonable, it 
may not be if the benefits are based on studies done by the very
companies that develop and promote the drugs.  Some have noted that 
companies have a conflict of interest even in the basic studies establishing 
safety and efficacy,381 and have called for such studies to be publicly
funded.382  There are examples of situations where doctors and patients
rely on industry-financed data and only later discover that there are 
problems; for example, for decades, based on industry data, women took 
hormone replacement therapy to not only treat menopause but also to
prevent heart disease, only to later discover from an NIH study that the
drugs actually increased the risk of heart disease.383  Moreover, companies
380. Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment To Prevent Heart Attack 
Trial (ALLHAT) Officers et al., Major Outcomes in High-Risk Hypertensive Patients
Randomized to Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme Inhibitor or Calcium Channel Blocker 
vs Diuretic, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2981, 2985–86 (2002). 
381. See, e.g., Catherine D. DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Impugning the Integrity 
of Medical Science: The Adverse Effects of Industry Influence, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1833, 
1833 (2008).
382. See, e.g., Tracy R. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight 
of Clinical Trials, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Jan. 2007, at 1; Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking
the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a
Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2009); Marc A. Rodwin
& John D. Abramson, Clinical Trial Data as a Public Good, 308 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
871, 872 (2012); Working Document – Barbados and Bolivia Proposal 6: Clinical Trials 
on Medicines as Global Public Goods (2008), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/b_b_igwg/ 
prop6_clinical_trials_as_as_global_public_goods.pdf (last visited May 20, 2014). An alternative 
proposal is to separate companies that develop drugs from those that do clinical testing 
and marketing. See, e.g., FINKELSTEIN & TEMIN, supra note 8; SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN 
THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 
(2003).
383. See, e.g., Catherine Kreatsoulas & Sonia S. Anand, Menopausal Hormone
Therapy for the Primary Prevention of Chronic Conditions, 123 POLISH ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MED. 112 (2013); Heidi D. Nelson et al., Menopausal Hormone Therapy for
the Primary Prevention of Chronic Conditions: A Systematic Review To Update the U.S.
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have no incentive to do comparative research because it may in fact
reveal that their drug is not better; indeed, when Bristol-Meyers Squibb 
attempted to establish that its cholesterol-lowering drug compared well
to Pfizer’s Lipitor, it got the bad news on its previously top-selling drug, 
which the Wall Street Journal reported as a corporate mistake.384 
At a minimum, there must be awareness of the conflict of interest. 
Companies obviously have an incentive to reach certain conclusions,
which not only has resulted in ghost writing of studies385 but in some 
cases outright fraud and misrepresentation in hiding evidence. For 
example, in the debacle involving the patented COX-2 anti-inflammatory
drug marketed by Merck as Vioxx—the third best-selling drug in 2003 
with over $2 billion a year in sales—the drug was pulled off the market
when suppressed studies indicated that it was associated with an increase 
in heart attacks and strokes.386  In addition, although doctors widely
Diana Petitti, Commentary, Hormone Replacement Therapy and Coronary Heart Disease:
Four Lessons, 33 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 461 (2004).  After years of research, the benefits of
such therapy remain controversial. See, e.g., JoAnn E. Manson et al., Menopausal Hormone 
Therapy and Health Outcomes During the Intervention and Extended Poststopping
Phases of the Women’s Health Initiative Randomized Trials, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1353 (2013); see also Larry Husten, Long Terms Study Results Offer Broad Perspective on 
Hormone Replacement Therapy for Women, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/larryhusten/2013/10/01/long-terms-study-results-offer-broad-perspective-on-
hormone-replacement-therapy-for-women (noting the results of hormone replacement theory
in younger women are still inconclusive).
384. See Ron Winslow, Blood Feud: For Bristol-Myers, Challenging Pfizer Was a Big 
Mistake, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2004, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB107876021684949151; see also Trudo Lemmens, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Secrecy
About Clinical Trials, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14, 15 (Sept-Oct. 2004) (discussing
Wall Street Journal article).
385. This involves companies providing nearly finished manuscripts to investigators
who “author” them without sometimes even seeing the underlying data.  E.g., Thomas
Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinician Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1542 (2000).  There is often also manipulation of study results,
or studies written by those who have a conflict of interest as paid consultants of companies.
DeAngelis & Fontanarosa, supra note 381, at 1833. 
386. See, e.g., HOLLY PRESLEY, INSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: VIOXX AND THE MERCK 
TEAM EFFORT (2009), available at https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
Case-Study-Vioxx.pdf; Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better
Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941 (2007); Ronald M. Green, 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Pharmaceutical Ethics: The Case of Vioxx, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 749 (2006); Jef Feeley, Merck Pays $23 Million To End Vioxx Drug-










      
 
  
   
 
    







       
  
    
   
      
   
    
  
    
  
     
   
 
    
         
  
report that they understand that companies market to them and assume
that they are not influenced by such marketing,387 studies suggest 
otherwise,388 consistent with social science research demonstrating that 
despite intentions to be objective, doctors are human and fall prey to 
biases.389 This is particularly problematic because there is presently a
2013-07-18/merck-pays-23-million-to-end-vioxx-drug-purchase-suits.html; Peter Loftus 
& Brent Kendall, Merck To Pay $950 Million in Vioxx Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204531404577054472253737682.
There was also intentional suppression of data that showed the antidepressant drug promoted 
as Paxil was not efficacious and also that the drugs were potentially dangerous for children, 
which resulted in a lawsuit against GlaxoSmithKline for misrepresentation. See, e.g., 
ALISON BASS, SIDE EFFECTS: A PROSECUTOR, A WHISTLEBLOWER, AND A BESTSELLING 
ANTIDEPRESSANT ON TRIAL 3–4 (2008); Wayne Kondro & Barbara Sibbald, Drug Company 
Experts Advised Staff To Withhold Data About SSRI Use in Children, 170 CANADIAN MED.
ASS’N J. 783, 783 (2004).  There are also other cases of companies paying millions of dollars 
in fines because of fraud that focuses on marketing problems, but not necessarily data
concerning efficacy of drugs. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Pfizer To Pay $430 Million over
Promoting Drugs to Doctors, N.Y.TIMES (May 14, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/14/
business/pfizer-to-pay-430-million-over-promoting-drug-to-doctors.html; Jeremy Laurance, 
Drug Giants Fined $11bn for Criminal Wrongdoing, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/drug-giants-fined-
11bn-for-criminal-wrongdoing-815748 3.html.
387. E.g., Susan Chimonas et al., Physicians and Drug Representatives: Exploring 
the Dynamics of the Relationship, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 184, 184 (2007) (finding 
that the majority of residents believed that they were not influenced by marketing efforts,
but assumed that only sixteen percent of their colleagues would be immune from influence); 
Mary-Margaret Chren, Interactions Between Physicians and Drug Company Representatives, 
107 AM. J. MED. 182, 182 (1999) (suggesting that physicians understand that sales reps 
can influence them, but they engage in a variety of denials and rationalizations to hold the
belief that they are not influenced); see also Kirsten E. Austad et al., Medical Students’ 
Exposure to and Attitudes About the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Systematic Review, PLOS
MED. 1 (May 24, 2011), http://www.plosmedicine. org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3
Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001037&representation=PDF (finding undergraduate 
medical students to have positive attitudes about marketing and skepticism about potential for
bias).
388. See, e.g., Jerry Avorn et al., Scientific Versus Commercial Sources of Influence on
the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4, 7–8 (1982); Anthony D. Bower &
Gary L. Burkett, Family Physicians and Generic Drugs: A Study of Recognition, Information 
Sources, Prescribing Attitudes, and Practices, 24 J. FAM. PRAC. 612, 614–16 (1987); T.
Shawn Caudill et al., Physicians, Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives, and the Cost of
Prescribing, 5 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 201, 201 (1996); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and
the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 J. AM. MED ASS’N 373, 
373, 375–76, 378–79 (2000) (discussing how increased interactions between physicians
and companies led to increased prescription costs and nonrational prescribing).
389. Indeed, some suggest that even small gifts to doctors may result in bias. See, e.g., 
Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians 
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dearth of independent research on comparative effectiveness, such that a
great deal of “research” available to doctors is sponsored by drug companies
and thus may reflect drug company bias.390 
2. Exploring Other Patent Schemas? 
There may also be other issues thus far taken as “truth” in patent law
that are in fact schemas that should be further explored. This subpart 
will merely raise a few that stem naturally from the issues discussed 
above.391  At the domestic level, there may be schemas that a single patent 
covers a single drug and that the patent term for drugs are substantially
shorter than for other inventions.392  In fact, recent evidence noted above
shows that multiple patents tend to cover each drug, usually with 
sequential expiration dates, such that the effective patent term is not as 
short as PhRMA, or those with a strong patent schema, typically
Large and Small: Toward an Understanding of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Industry
Gift Giving, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39, 39–41, 43–44 (2003). 
390. See, e.g., Keyhani & Federman, supra note 327, at 693 (noting that doctors are 
often exposed to selective promotion of research that may reflect the opinion of the industry). 
391. However, there are likely many more.  For example, there could be a schema 
that drugs are better than non-drug methods of treatment.  Many people often seek a pill 
to solve a problem—whether it is high blood pressure, sleeping problems, or depression— 
instead of nondrug lifestyle treatments.  This is true even when there are studies that suggest
that the drug is no more effective than a placebo, as was the case with the highly popular 
SSRI antidepressants. E.g., Irving Kirsch & Thomas J. Moore, The Emperor’s New Drugs:
An Analysis of Antidepressant Medication Data Submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, PREVENTION & TREATMENT 1 (July 15, 2002), http://alphachoices.com/ 
repository/assets/pdf/EmperorsNewDrugs.pdf (finding that for the six most widely used
antidepressant drugs approved between 1987 and 199, including Prozac, placebos were 80
percent as effective).  Of course, antidepressants may not be the best example because
scientists do not entirely understand how they work.  But, there are other examples as well.
For example, for many years, women were advised to take hormone replacement therapy 
based on industry-sponsored studies that suggested it would prevent heart disease; however,
the NIH subsequently found this was not effective and recent studies suggest that such 
therapy should not generally be recommended. See supra note 383 and accompanying 
text. Nonetheless, current public health focuses predominantly on a “biomedical model,” 
rather than considering social determinants of health, such as socioeconomic status and 
other lifestyle factors.  In addition, this schema is reinforced by companies that can protect
patented drugs, but not lifestyle interventions. See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 166, at 
1928–29, 1946–48. 







   
   
    


















    
suggests.393  In addition, at the international level, there are likely schemas 
concerning compulsory licenses, as well as the impact of stronger patent
protection for developing countries.394  The industry has repeatedly claimed 
that compulsory licenses are anathema to innovation and that other 
countries will benefit from stronger patent protection, a claim that the 
United States Trade Representatives Office has thus far adopted wholesale
in demanding that other countries adopt stronger protection.395  However, 
data does not wholeheartedly support stronger patent protection.396 
In addition to considering these schemas, further consideration of how 
patents interrelate with cultural cognition may be a prime area for
additional exploration. Notably, although schemas and confirmation bias
shed some light, they do not necessarily provide a complete solution to
how to modify strongly held schemas.  Cultural cognition, on the other 
hand, aims to get at culturally based reasons for different world views, 
such that there is the potential for modification.397  Thus far, those who
have worked in this area have not explored patents, but perhaps the time 
is ripe for such a consideration.398 
393. See Kapczinski et al., supra note 279. 
394. See generally supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text (selective consideration 
of international evidence)
395. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (noting that USTR often echoes 
industry). 
396. See supra Part III.C.2.
 397. See, e.g., Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, 
the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun
Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569, 570–71, 579, 606–07 (2006); John Gastil et al., Deliberation 
Across the Cultural Divide: Assessing the Potential for Reconciling Conflicting Cultural 
Orientations to Reproductive Technology, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1772, 1773–74, 1797 
(2008); Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117, 126– 
28, 130, 154 (2007). In addition, cultural cognition supports different inferences based 
on the same fact. E.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-
Government 1–4, 24–25 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 307, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2319992. 
398. See, e.g., The Cultural Cognition Project, YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://www.
culturalcognition.net/projects (last visited May 20, 2014).  This may be changing, although 
there is likely still room for additional research.  See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Cultural 
Cognition of Patents, 4 IP THEORY (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2333216 (suggesting that cultural cognition might help
to understand conflicts over patents in general, rather than the specific schemas addressed
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article hopes to provide a balanced picture of how current patent 
law and policy promotes mostly modest, yet high priced new drugs, as 
well as how cognitive biases have perpetuated this situation.  This 
Article highlights the important interplay of cognitive biases not only by 
the frequently maligned industry but also previously presumed neutral 
parties, such as academics and policymakers.  Most scholars would likely 
agree that considering how to optimize or at least not distort innovation
is an important part of legal scholarship.  However, to date, there has 
been little recognition, let alone robust discussion, of how patent and
related laws promote problematic innovation of drugs, resulting in a 
situation where society is “drugged out” of necessary therapies.  Although 
some scholars and policymakers have recognized that pharmaceutical
innovation is mostly incremental, such recognition has thus far focused
on proposing solutions outside the patent arena with no challenges to the 
fundamental patent law dialogue.  This Article hopes to provide a first 
step toward doing so.
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